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Raymond E. Quesnel and East Coast Project Financing
R.J. (Jack) Thrasher* Issues
In this article, the authors provide a comprehensive review of project financing as
a means to fundoilandgasprojects in the Atlantic Canada offshore. Inparticular,
the nature and characteristics of project financing are examined, together with a
review of some recent East Coast project financings and an analysis of the legal
and contractual framework that comes into play. This is followed byan extensive
discussion on the structuring of a project financing including a consideration of the
risks involved and how those risks may be allocated.
Dans cet article, les auteurs approfondissentla question du financementdeprojet
comme moyen de financement des projets d'exploitation p~troli~re et gazi~re
extrac6ti~re le long des c6tes du Canada Atlantique. Ils examinentla nature etles
caract~ristiques des accords de financement, font le bilan des op6rations de
financement de certains projets r~cents de la c6te Atlantique et d6cortiquent le
cadre Idgislatif et contractuel qui entre en ligne de compte. Is terminent par un
expos6 fort d~taill sur la structuration du financement de projet en prenant en
consideration la nature et la r~partition des risques.
* Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt LLP.
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I. Nature of Project Finance
Lenders providing project financing generally agree to look to the project
itself, rather than the sponsors or participants, as the primary source of
revenues to repay and service the financing. In such cases the collateral
are the revenues derived from the project and the assets of the project used
to produce them. The recourse of the lenders is generally limited to those
assets and revenues, and does not extend, except through specifically
negotiated credit supports or enhancements, to the participants in the
project or their sponsors.' The returns of the lenders do not usually
include participation in the project upside - through a royalty, net profit
interest or other form of participation. They are generally limited to the
margin earned on the money they lend over the cost of funds2 and the fees
they may earn for performing various related services.
1. Project financing has been defined as the "financing of a particular economic unit in which
a lender is satisfied to look initially to the cash flows and earnings of that unit as the source of
funds from which a loan will be repaid and to the assets of the economic unit as collateral for
the loan." P.K. Nevitt & F.J. Fabozzi, Project Financing, 7th ed. (London: Euromoney Books,
2000) at 1, as quoted, from 1st ed., in S.E. Rauner, "Project Finance: A Risk Spreading
Approach to the Commercial Financing of Economic Development" (1993) 24 Harv. Int'l L.J.
145 at 155.
In Graham Vinter's Project Finance, 2d ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1998) at xxxi,
Vinter defines his subject as "financing the development or exploitation of a right, natural
resource or other asset where the bulk of the financing is not to be provided by any form of share
capital and is to be repaid principally out of revenues produced by the project in question."
Hoffman describes "project finance" as "a nonrecourse or limited recourse financing
structure in which debt, equity, and credit enhancement are combined for the construction and
operation, or the refinancing of a particular facility in a capital-intensive industry, in which
lenders base credit appraisals on the projected revenues from the operation of the facility, rather
than on the general assets or the credit of the sponsor of the facility, and rely on the assets of
the facility, including any revenue-producing contracts and other cash flow generated by the
facility, as collateral for the debt." S.L. Hoffman, "The Law and Business of International
Project Finance: a resource for governments, sponsors, lenders, lawyers and project partici-
pants" (Kluwer Law International, 2000) at 4-5. See also S.L. Hoffman, "A Practical Guide
to Transactional Project Finance: Basic Concepts, Risk Identification, and Contractual
Considerations" (1989) 45 Bus. Law. 181 at 181, note 1.
Wynant states that "project financing is a financing of a major independent capital
investment that the sponsoring company has segregated from its assets and general purpose
obligations. The economic prospects of the project, combined with commitments from the
sponsor and third parties, provide the support for extensive borrowings carrying limited
financial recourse to the parent company." L. Wynant, "Essential Elements of Project
Financing" (1980) Harv. Bus. Rev. 165 at 166. See also P.R. Wood, Law and Practice of
International Finance: Project Finance, Subordinated Debt and State Loans (London: Sweet
& Maxwell, 1995) at 3.
2. S. Mills, "Project Financing of Oil and Gas Field Developments" (1994) 8 J. Int'l Bank. L.
305 at 306.
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II. Characteristics of a Project Financing
1. General
A project financing structure generally includes:
(a) debt obligations issued by the participants (or a vehicle controlled by
the participants) in the project, with specified obligations for repay-
ment of principal and of debt service costs, and remedies for failure
to perform those obligations;
(b) limitations on the recourse the lenders holding those debt obliga-
tions have in the event of the failure to perform those obligations,
which generally involve the lenders accepting some of the risks
associated with the project;3
(c) a set of full or qualified recourse obligations from the participants or
the project entity to the lenders designed to ensure the fundamental
underpinnings of the project (compliance with regulatory require-
ments, maintenance of corporate status of participants, etc.) on
which the lenders rely in accepting or sharing the risks for which
their recourse is limited;
(d) collateral security on the hard assets of the project and the revenues
resulting from the operation of the project, to ensure servicing and
repayment of the debt obligations; and
(e) credit enhancement arrangements between the lenders and the
participants, project sponsors or other persons having an interest on
the project (such as suppliers, customers or users of the product or
service the project produces).4
Because project financing involves negotiated contractual arrange-
ments that shift rights and responsibilities between the parties, it is
essentially a legal solution to some of the major problems of financing
economic development.5
Participants may wish to project finance, even though the cost of such
financing may be higher than they are able to obtain on their own credit,
because of:
(a) a desire to husband the use of corporate resources and preserve
flexibility by avoiding too large a commitment to any one project;
(b) increasing the debt element of project funding and, potentially, the
return on equity if the project is successful;6
(c) concerns over common liabilities in a joint venture arrangement
particularly where a participant is financially stronger than some of
the other participants;7
3. Vinter, supra note I at 5; see also Wynant, supra note 1 at 166.
4. Hoffman, supra note 1 at 184; Wynant, ibid.
5. Rauner, supra note 1 at 145.
6. Mills, supra note 2 at 305.
7. Wynant, supra note I at 172; Mills, ibid.
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(d) the fact that having more stakeholders involved in the project (such
as major international lenders) can sometimes give the project a
better negotiating position on political issues;'
(e) a desire to limit the adverse impact on the participants' general
borrowing costs by limiting the adverse effect on credit ratings or
borrowing capacities;9
(f) the enormous costs of some projects and the drain on cash flow their
funding would represent if financed internally by the participants; 0
and
(g) a desire to lay off or limit specific risks."
2. Recourse
An important aspect of a project financing is the opportunity for the
borrower to limit the lenders' recourse, in circumstances where the
project does not provide the revenue required to satisfy the project debt,
to realization in respect of the project assets and the revenues produced
by the project, as opposed to recovery from the borrower through
recourse on corporate covenants or other forms of direct recourse
obligations. It is this limited recourse feature that is the hallmark of a true
project financing. 2 And it is the tension involved in the definition of the
circumstances in which the lenders' recourse will be limited to the
underlying assets and revenues, with the risks attendant on the failure to
produce the required revenues, that makes negotiating a project financing
arrangement such a challenging exercise. Lenders may be prepared to
accept specific project risks such as reserves, reservoir, market and the
like, but only if the required underpinnings of the project are in place. The
limited recourse of the lenders is often predicated upon a series of full or
qualified recourse covenants and undertakings from the participants
directed at assuring the lenders that the fundamental structure of the
project they are lending on the basis of will be preserved. 3
3. Security
In a project financing, the lenders take security on the hard assets that
make up the project facilities, often through fixed charges (where
appropriate) and a general floating charge, as well as a variety of specific
charges or security interests, depending on the nature of the assets.
8. See L.T. Wells and E.S. Gleason, "Is Foreign Infrastructure Investment Still Risky?"
(1995) 73 Harv. Bus. Rev. 44 at 53.
9. Vinter, supra note 1 at 23; Mills, supra note 2 at 305.
10. Rauner, supra note 1 at 154.
11. Mills, supra note 2 at 305.
12. Woods, supra note 1 at 23.
13. Vinter, supra note 1 at 5.
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These tangible assets of the project, particularly in the offshore area,
generally do not represent sufficient security for the project loan. The real
security for the loan is the revenue resulting from the sale of production
from the project or the use of the project facilities. It is this revenue the
lender must be assured of in order to justify the project financing.
Accordingly, when considering whether to finance on a project finance
basis, the lender will consider whether
(a) project costs until project completion can be satisfied and specified
performance standards can be achieved without requiring contribu-
tions from the lenders,
(b) there is recourse to creditworthy parties if the project is not com-
pleted or does not attain the required levels of performance,
(c) project revenues will be sufficient to cover repayment of the project
finance debt, debt service and operating costs in the currencies that
such debt service and operating costs are required to be paid, and
(d) there are reliable arrangements in place to ensure that project
revenues will be allocated to repay and service the project finance
debt. 14
4. Project Financing of Separate Interests
Project financing may be done on an entire project or on the separate
interest of an individual participant. The latter is more complicated,
particularly if some participants do not require project financing. The
very nature of an undivided interest in a project, and the web of project
agreements that may require modification for project financing purposes
when some of the participants are not using project finance, present
challenges for the lenders and the participants that wish to project finance.
In some projects the participants (joint venture or otherwise) use a single
purpose corporation to manage the project, and the project financing is
done on a separate unit basis with required collateral support (such as
guarantees, direct agreements, reserve funds, etc.) from the individual
participants. The opportunities to limit recourse where such a single
purpose entity is used are obvious. Absent circumstances in which a court
might pierce the corporate veil, the only recourse to the participants
themselves beyond the assets held by the entity will be that provided
through specific credit enhancements bargained for and granted by the
participants, such as guarantees, back stop arrangements, debt service or
reserve accounts, assignments of project revenues or the like. In some
major East Coast projects, however, the project financing has been done
on the basis of the separate undivided interests of the individual partici-
14. Ibid. at 103-04.
220 The Dalhousie Law Journal
pants. In the Hibernia project, each of the initial participants entered into
a project loan facility with the lenders, with respect to the participant's
separate undivided interest in the project. In the Terra Nova project, only
Husky has to date done a project financing and that was with respect to
its undivided interest in the project.
Ill. Recent East Coast Project Financings
In recent years there have been a number of East Coast project financings.
We examine four of them.
1. Hibernia Development Project
In 1991, project financing arrangements were entered into with respect to
the Hibernia development project, an offshore oil development project
located approximately 315 kilometres east-southeast of St. John's, New-
foundland. The current owners of Hibernia are Mobil Oil Canada Prop-
erties, Mobil Canada Hibernia Company Ltd., Petro-Canada Hibernia
Partnership, Chevron Canada Resources, Murphy Atlantic Offshore Oil
Company Ltd., Norsk Hydro Canada Oil & Gas Inc. and Canada Hibernia
Holding Corporation. Pursuant to agreements entered into in 1990
between the Government of Canada and the then-owners of Hibernia
relating to the provision of financial assistance facilities for the project,
a $1.66 billion primary guarantee facility was provided by Canada. The
facility allowed the owners, under certain circumstances, to issue debt
instruments in order to raise money for construction costs for the project
backed by a Government of Canada guarantee. Canada held security on
the project assets that was not dissimilar to that found in a project
financing. The policy of the Government of Canada at the time required
that when the government provided financial assistance to a project, such
as the primary guarantee facility, third party lenders be involved in the
project to provide ongoing monitoring in respect of the project and to
assume a portion of the project financing risk. Pursuant to the project
financing arrangements relating to Hibernia, the owners received a
financial commitment from the project lenders to provide, after produc-
tion start-up, $415 million in project financing subject to satisfaction of
predetermined drawdown tests relating to project economics. If draw-
down occurred, the project loan facility would replace 25 percent of the
government guaranteed financing under an owner's primary guarantee
facility. The repayment of the project loan facilities would not be
guaranteed by Canada. The project lenders also committed to provide
Canada with fiscal and monitoring services in respect of the project,
similar to those that a lead lender would customarily provide to a
syndicated lending group.
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2. Husky Terra Nova Finance Ltd.
The Terra Nova oil development project15 involves the development,
construction and operation of a floating production and storage facility
(FPSO) to exploit the crude oil reserves of the Terra Nova oil field located
inthe Jeanne d' Arc Basin, off the East Coast of Newfoundland. The Terra
Nova project owners are again a consortium of oil companies including
Petro-Canada Terra Nova Partnership, Mobil Oil Canada Properties,
Husky Terra Nova Partnership, Norsk Hydro Canada Oil & Gas Inc.,
Murphy Oil Company Ltd., Mosbacher Operating Ltd. and Chevron
Canada Resources.
Husky Terra Nova Partnership, which holds an undivided interest in
Terra Nova through Husky Terra Nova Finance Ltd. (Finance), a funding
vehicle and direct wholly owned subsidiary of the partnership, issued
U.S. $250 million senior secured bonds due in 2012. The partnership will
use the proceeds of the issue to fund 67 percent of its share of the Terra
Nova project. The partnership has pledged all of its rights under its
undivided interest in the project to the bondholders to secure the bond
obligations. Finance has a first claim on all revenues the partnership
receives from its sale of Terra Nova crude oil, with the result that the debt
servicing and repayment of the bonds has a priority claim to those
revenues subject only to provincial royalty claims on certain assets and
the claims of other owners who have funded the partnership's share of
operating costs following a default by the partnership in funding those
costs.
Husky Oil Operations Ltd. (HOOL) will provide the partnership with
all transportation services necessary to ship its Terra Nova crude oil to
market pursuant to a transportation and marketing services agreement. In
order to meet this obligation to the partnership, HOOL has entered into
transportation agreements that relate to tanker capacity and a transship-
ment facility.16
HOOL's interest in the production licence, which allows HOOL to
benefit from the oil extracted from the field and provide cash flow to
Finance, will be assigned to the partnership. All revenues received by the
partnership will be deposited directly with a trustee for the benefit of the
bondholders.17 Under the terms of the development and operating agree-
ment and through an additional undertaking by HOOL to the bondhold-
15. The description of the project is taken from Standard & Poor's, "Husky Terra Nova
Finance Ltd." Ratings Direct (25 August 1999) [hereinafter "S & P Husky Terra Nova"].
16. Ibid. at 17.
17. Ibid.
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ers, HOOL remains liable for funding the project's royalty and operating
costs and incremental capital expenditures over the term of the agree-
ment. 8
The lending structure permits Finance to incur additional debt, subject
to a rating confirmation requirement taking into account the incidence of
the debt. If reserves, as demonstrated by an annual reserve test, are less
than 90 percent of the partnership's base forecast, the partnership will be
required to fund into a debt service reserve account an amount equal to
the percentage of the remaining debt service on the bonds that is
equivalent to the reduction in the reserves. If a reserve report after 2005
does not demonstrate proved reserves of at least 70 million barrels in the
years beyond the final debt maturity date (the "tail" period), the Partner-
ship will be required to fund an additional amount equal to the last three
years of debt service.19
3. Maritimes & Northeast Pipeline
The Maritimes & Northeast Pipeline20 consists of Canadian and United
States mainlines and laterals. The Canadian mainline consists of 352
miles of pipeline extending from the outlet point of a hydrocarbon
processing plant near Goldboro, Nova Scotia to the U.S. border near St.
Stephen, New Brunswick, with a lateral to Point Tupper, Nova Scotia.
The U.S. mainline is a 306-mile pipeline from the international border to
the interconnection with Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. near Dracut, Mas-
sachusetts. The Canadian pipeline is owned by Maritimes & Northeast
Pipeline Limited Partnership (Maritimes-Canada), a New Brunswick
limited partnership, and the United States pipeline is owned by Maritimes
& North East LLC, a Delaware limited liability company. Both pipeline
owners are affiliates of Duke Energy, Westcoast Energy, Mobil Corpo-
ration and Nova Scotia Power. The pipeline transports gas produced by
the Sable Offshore Energy Project in the offshore region of Nova Scotia.
Sable involves facilities both onshore and offshore which will produce,
transmit and process the natural gas from the fields. Gas will be collected
from offshore production platforms and transported by a submarine
pipeline to the gas plant at Goldboro, Nova Scotia. The natural gas
liquids, separated from the gas, will then be transported by an onshore
liquids pipeline from Country Harbour for further processing and ship-
ping at the liquids processing facility in Port Tupper, Cape Breton. The
Sable Offshore Energy Project is owned by Sable Offshore Energy Inc.,
18. Ibid. at 18.
19. Ibid. at 17.
20. The description of the project is taken from Standard& Poor's, Ratings Direct: Maritimes
& Northeast Pipeline LP. (14 June 1999).
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which is in turn owned directly or indirectly by Mobil, Shell Canada Ltd.,
Imperial Oil Resources Limited, Nova Scotia Resources Ltd. and
Mosbacher Operating Ltd.
The Maritimes & Northeast Project participants have issued bonds in
the United States and Canada. The proceeds will be used to pay the costs
of constructing American and Canadian portions of the project and
related facilities, as well as to repay certain previously incurred indebt-
edness. The bonds are secured by (a) a perfected, first-priority pledge of
the contract revenues; (b) a perfected, first-priority lien on the funds in the
collateral accounts under the trust indenture; (c) a perfected, first-priority
pledge of member interests in the pipeline; and (d) a floating charge on
the property of Maritimes-Canada.
There is a sponsor completion guarantee in place for the pipeline
project. A substantial portion of the United States capacity and the
Canadian capacity (90 percent or more in each case) is contracted under
firm service agreements (FSAs). The majority of the project's contracted
volumes under the FSAs are with shippers rated at least A- by Standard
& Poor. The risk of shipper defaults and FSAs expiring before the bonds
mature are covered by pipeline utilization agreements (PUAs) with the
Sable producers that provide payments for unsubscribed capacity. Mobil
has given a backstop obligation to pay for unsubscribed capacity to the
extent it is not transported or paid for pursuant to the PUAs.
4. Newfoundland Transshipment Terminal
The Newfoundland Transshipment Terminal at Whiffenhead, New-
foundland commenced operations in 1999. It is owned by Newfoundland
Transshipment Ltd. (NTL), which is in turn owned, directly or indirectly,
by affiliates of Chevron Canada Resources Limited, Mobil Oil Canada
Ltd., IMTT-NTL Ltd., Petro-Canada, Norsk Hydro Canada Oil & Gas
Inc., Murphy Atlantic Offshore Oil Company Ltd. and Husky Oil
Operations Ltd. NTL has contracted an international terminal operator,
International Matex Tank Terminals, to manage and operate the terminal.
The NTL facility has three heated crude oil storage tanks and a berth
that can accommodate 35,000- to 150,000-deadweight-ton tankers, as
well as other facilities to load and unload vessels carrying oil from the oil
producing projects in the region (such as Hibernia and Terra Nova) to
markets in Canada, the U.S. and other parts of the world. Additional tanks
and another berth are in the process of being added this year.
The costs of constructing the NTL facility were financed in part by a
project financing facility put in place with a syndicate of banks. Because
there have been no public issues of securities in connection with this
project financing, there is very little public information available about
224 The Dalhousie Law Journal
the financing itself. The participants in the producing projects are each
customers of NTL and their commitments to take and pay for storage
space in the terminal pursuant to reserved capacity service agreements are
important factors in the project financing of the facility.
IV. Constitutional and Legal Framework
To talk of a typical offshore structure is somewhat misleading. The very
size and complexity of offshore energy projects results in each one being
unique. The number of East Coast offshore projects is relatively small,
making generalizations all the more difficult. The Canadian East Coast
legal and fiscal regimes are themselves unique and still evolving. Never-
theless, some general observations on project structure can be made. We
will discuss the constitutional setting that is the backdrop to the current
legal framework applicable to the East Coast offshore, the current
federal-provincial joint resource management regimes, political risk
issues, the rights tenure system, royalty structures, ownership and oper-
ating arrangements and construction, lifting, transportation and produc-
tion sales issues.
1. Constitutional Setting
The legal regime applicable to East Coast offshore energy development
has evolved in response to competing claims to jurisdiction over offshore
mineral resources. The Government of Canada and coastal provinces for
many years engaged in a constitutional debate over which level of
government has legislative jurisdiction over, and ownership of, offshore
resources. A series of Supreme Court of Canada decisions2 and a
decision of the Newfoundland Court of Appeal22 appeared to resolve the
matter in favour of the federal government, at least insofar as the
continental shelf proper is concerned. Coastal provinces have, however,
refused to accept these decisions as determinative of the jurisdictional
issue and have continued to assert jurisdiction over mineral resources in
the continental shelf adjacent to their shores. As well, certain legal
scholars have argued that the decisions of the courts are wrong, citing
historical reasons and constitutional and international law principles. 3
21. Reference Re Offshore Mineral Rights of British Columbia, 11967] S.C.R. 792; Reference
Re the Seabed and Subsoil of the Continental Shelf Offshore Newfoundland, [1984] 1 S.C.R.
86 [hereinafter the Hibernia Reference]; and Canada (A.G.) v. British Columbia (A. G.), [1984]
4 W.W.R. 289 (S.C.C.).
22. Reference Re Mineral and Other Natural Resources of the Continental Shelf (1983), 145
D.L.R. (3d) 9 (Nfld. C.A.).
23. Forexample, seeE.A. Fitzgerald, "The NewfoundlandOffshore Reference: Federal-Provincial
Conflict Over Offshore Energy Resources" (1991) 23 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 1.
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2. Joint Resource Management
Ongoing jurisdictional disputes are not conducive to offshore energy
development. Investment decisions by project participants and lending
decisions by project lenders are hampered when the fundamental legal
structure in which a project is to be developed is uncertain. In the East
Coast offshore region, this issue has been dealt with as a practical matter,
if not finally resolved from a constitutional perspective, by agreements
between the Government of Canada and each of the provinces of
Newfoundland and Nova Scotia establishing joint offshore resource
management regimes. On 11 February 1985 the Government of Canada
and the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador entered into the
Atlantic Accord. The Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Re-
sources Accord was signed the following year (The Atlantic Accord and
the Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord will be
referred to collectively as the Accords and individually as an Accord).
Each Accord has been implemented through complementary federal and
provincial legislation.24
The Accord Acts are important from a project financing perspective.
They exhibit the political resolve of the federal and provincial govern-
ments to provide the long-term, stable political environment necessary to
foster offshore energy development. They also establish the legal frame-
work in which offshore projects will operate.
3. Political Issues
It seems somewhat unnatural for Canadians to analyze our own industrial
development from a political risk perspective apart, perhaps, from the
question of Quebec secession. Canada is one of the most stable democ-
racies in the world. Nevertheless, lenders, investment bankers and rating
agencies should and often do consider political risk in connection with the
financing of any large energy project, particularly where recourse in
cases of default is limited to the project assets in whole or part.
This is not to suggest that there is a significant degree of political risk
associated with East Coast offshore energy projects. However, as noted
above, theAccordActs do not resolve the question of offshore jurisdiction
as much as they put the fundamental question of jurisdiction on suspen-
sion. The Accords and the Accord Acts are based on a "mirror image"
concept. The federal Accord Acts and the provincial Accord Acts are
24. Canada-Newfoundland Atlantic Accord Implementation Act, S.C. 1987, c. 3;
Canada-Newfoundland Atlantic Accord Implementation Newfoundland Act, R.S.N. 1990, c.
C-2; Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord Implementation Act, S.C.
1988, c. 28; and Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord Implementation
(Nova Scotia) Act, S.N.S. 1987, c. 3 [hereinafter referred to collectively as the Accord Acts].
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essentially mirror images of one another. They are based on the notion
that neither level of government has conceded jurisdictional authority.
The mirror allows each level of government to put aside jurisdictional
claims while at the same time ensuring that, ultimately, whichever
government has jurisdiction and whichever statute (federal or provincial)
ultimately governs, the same set of rules applies to offshore energy
development. While this is of enormous benefit to the oil and gas
industry, there are some risks that the industry, project lenders and rating
agencies must be aware of. These risks should be brought to their
attention and assessed in the due diligence process.
A fundamental risk exists because the integrity and stability of the East
Coast offshore regime relies on the political goodwill and cooperative
efforts of the federal and provincial governments. Absent these, the
system could break down. Bitter intergovernmental disputes (such as
those underlying the National Energy Program of the early 1980s and
resulting provincial responses) are not unknown in Canada and could re-
appear in the future. Currently, however, there is nothing of this nature on
the horizon. The Accords have proven to be quite robust.
How might the current federal-provincial joint resource management
regime break down? First, the Accord Acts and any regulations promul-
gated thereunder must maintain the mirror. As amendments to the
legislation are made and as regulations are enacted, each level of
government must act in tandem. If the political will to do so erodes, the
regime could begin to disintegrate, with different levels of government
enacting different rules. This would undoubtedly lead to protracted and
costly litigation, leaving project participants and their financiers in limbo
as they await the outcome. The outcome might not be pleasant, particu-
larly, if the rules of the game in effect at the outset of the project are
changed substantially in a way that adversely affects project economics.
An alteration in the royalty or other fiscal aspects of a project would be
a case in point. A change in the legal and regulatory framework is a risk
in any project. On the East Coast of Canada, given the joint resource
management regime in effect, that risk could be considered greater.
A possible source of federal-provincial dispute arises from the very
nature and operation of the boards established to administer the regime,
the Canada-Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board and the
Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Board. The boards are intended
to operate as independent regulatory bodies and are responsible for a wide
variety of matters including issuing licences, regulating offshore opera-
tions and approving development plans. A board's independence is
limited, however, in respect of what the Accord Acts prescribe as
fundamental decisions. Fundamental decisions include such matters as
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approving development plans and cancelling licences for non-compliance
with the legislation. Fundamental decisions may be implemented by ia
board only after approval by both the federal and provincial energy
ministers. The AccordActs contemplate that the ministers will cooperate
with one another to reach consensus on fundamental decisions. If such
consensus cannot be reached, the legislation provides an intricate set of
overriding and suspensive vetoes. Generally, the federal minister has the
overriding discretion to implement a fundamental decision during peri-
ods when Canada does not enjoy energy self-sufficiency and security of
supply. This overriding discretion shifts to the provincial minister during
periods when Canada has attained energy self-sufficiency and security of
supply. A special rule applies in relation to the decision to approve or
disapprove a development plan or amendment thereof. The provincial
minister has the overriding discretion in this matter unless the federal
minister determines that the provincial minister's decision would unrea-
sonably delay the attainment of energy self-sufficiency and security of
supply. Under theAccordActs, the determination of energy self-sufficiency
and security of supply is made for successive five-year periods. At
present, Canada is not considered to enjoy energy self-sufficiency and
security of supply.
This intricate balance between federal and provincial power highlights
the delicate legal framework within which offshore energy projects on
Canada's East Coast will be developed. So far, the Accords, while not
perfect, have worked reasonably well and represent a pragmatic approach
to dealing with the jurisdictional issue. Nevertheless, the cooperative
approach exhibited to date may not last. Offshore energy projects take
years to develop to first production and are generally expected to have
field lives of one or two decades. Even if the federal and provincial
governments maintain a cooperative approach to offshore joint resource
management, there can be no assurance that a set of circumstances will
not arise in the future where a non-government party determines that it is
in its interest to challenge the constitutionality of the joint management
regime.
4. Tenure of Rights
Under the Accord Acts, there is a three-tiered land tenure system,
consisting of exploration licences, significant discovery licences and
production licences. Under an exploration licence, the holders are granted
the right to explore for hydrocarbons for a fixed period. At the end of that
period, the lands subject to the licence revert to Crown reserve unless a
significant discovery of hydrocarbons has been made.
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If a significant discovery has been made, the holders of an exploration
licence are entitled to apply for and receive a significant discovery licence
in respect of the area of the significant discovery. A significant discovery
licence has an indefinite term recognizing the long lead time necessary to
delineate and evaluate offshore reserves. Holders of significant discovery
licences are not required to establish the commerciality of the discovery
but, rather, simply to establish that the discovery warrants further work.
Once the commerciality of a discovery is established, the holders of a
significant discovery licence have the right to apply for and receive a
production licence for the commercial discovery area. Holders of a
production licence have the exclusive right to produce petroleum sub-
stances from the area to which the licence applies and obtain title to the
petroleum produced. A production licence has a term of twenty-five years
and continues in force for so long thereafter as production continues or the
licence area remains capable of commercial production. If a commercial
discovery is made, it is possible to proceed directly from the exploration
licence to a production licence. This was the case with the Hibernia
project. Generally, project participants will want to delay obtaining a
production licence until shortly before production start-up.
There are a wide variety of licences, permits and approvals required to
carry out an offshore energy project. The two most important are the
production licence and the development plan approval. The production
licence is the fundamental title document. It grants the project partici-
pants the right to produce, and title to, petroleum substances in the licence
area. Generally, the production licence is held by the project participants
in undivided shares or interests. There is no recognition in the legislation
of separate and several interests, and arguably each holder of a production
licence is liable, with each of the other holders, for all obligations in
respect of the licence. The terms and conditions of the production licence
must be reviewed by project lenders and, if applicable, rating agencies.
Thus far, production licences issued by the boards have been very simple
documents consisting of little more than the names of the licence holders
and their respective percentage interests, the term of the licence and the
lands to which the licence applies. In addition, the licences are issued
subject to the provisions of the applicable legislation. The form of licence
in current use purports to be issued pursuant to both Accord Acts, again
to maintain the mirror image concept underlying the implementing
legislation. It should be noted that the licence may be cancelled if the
holders fail to comply with the legislation. Therefore, project lenders
must ensure that the licence is in good standing and ascertain if there are
any governmental assurances with regard to cancellation. In at least one
instance, federal and provincial governments have given assurances that
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a production licence will not be cancelled as against project participants
who are in good standing in relation to royalty obligations notwithstand-
ing a royalty default by another participant.
5. Development Plan
Of equal importance to prospective lenders are the terms and conditions
of the development plan approval. An offshore project cannot proceed
without filing a development plan and having it approved by the relevant
board. A development plan filed with the board will deal with a myriad
of technical issues such as estimated field reserves, method of field
development, production, production rates, transportation, environmen-
tal protection and so forth, all of which are critical to project economics.
The board will conduct public hearings in relation to a development
plan as part of the approval process. Amendment of a development plan
also requires board approval, which may or may not involve further
public hearings depending on the nature and magnitude of the proposed
amendment. Development plan approval has invariably been granted
subject to various terms and conditions which must be satisfied by the
project participants. These terms and conditions must be carefully con-
sidered by project lenders and rating agencies in terms of their impact on
project economics, operational viability and the impact on the project of
a failure to fully satisfy them.
6. Regional Benefits
A development plan will be accompanied by a benefits plan mandated by
the Accord Acts. Such benefit plans must address the manner in which a
project will deal with issues of local hiring practices, training preferences
and contracting methodology, ensuring local businesses have fair access
in supplying goods and services to the project and technology transfer.
7. Royalty Structures
Of critical importance in assessing project economics and the ability to
obtain project financing is the fiscal regime applicable to the project.
Royalties on hydrocarbon production constitute a major component of
that fiscal regime, as do income, commodity and other taxes. A discussion
of the taxation regime applicable to the offshore area is beyond the scope
of this article. However, a few comments from a financing perspective are
worth making.
Under the Accords, Newfoundland and Nova Scotia have been allo-
cated responsibility, at least in a policy and political sense, for the design
of the royalty structures applicable to their respective offshore areas. The
federal Accord Acts themselves adopt by reference the royalties pre-
scribed by the provinces. The legislation also contemplates the establish-
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ment of generic royalty regimes. To date, comprehensive generic royalty
regimes have not been implemented. Royalties applicable to the Hibernia
project, apart from a nominal statutory royalty, are established by a
contract between the Hibernia project participants and Newfoundland. A
similar contractual approach to royalties has been negotiated in relation
to the Terra Nova project but is not yet in effect. While Newfoundland has
indicated its intention to enact a generic royalty regime and has outlined
that regime in terms of "royalty rates and triggers," it is not at all clear
when such a generic royalty regime will be implemented. It is unlikely
that such regime will be implemented prior to conclusion of the Terra
Nova royalty agreement. Nova Scotia has enacted royalty regulations
2
but the Sable project, the only large-scale offshore project in operation
offshore Nova Scotia, is governed by a hybrid royalty regime consisting
of a series of royalty agreements and the provincial regulations.
A generic royalty regime is something of a double-edged sword. On
the one hand, it may add certainty, stability and transparency in relation
to the royalty rules that will apply to a project. Such attributes assist
project lenders and rating agencies in assessing the feasibility of a project
and in making financing decisions. On the other hand, generic regimes
can be relatively inflexible and insensitive to the nuances of a particular
project. Moreover, generic regimes can be unilaterally changed by
legislative action. Most offshore energy projects, by their very nature, are
long-term affairs. The longer a project is in operation, the greater the risk
that royalty rules may change. While project economics and lending
decisions are made at the outset of a project based on a set of reasonable
assumptions, government priorities can change rapidly in response to
new policy objectives and political pressures, including changing eco-
nomic circumstances.
Royalty agreements with a province, on the other hand, offer flexibil-
ity, in that the royalty structure can be specifically tailored to fit the
project, taking into consideration such things as the size of project
reserves, the anticipated production profile and projected project cash
flows. In addition, such a royalty agreement affords some measure of
protection against arbitrary royalty changes imposed by government,
inasmuch as any adverse changes to the royalty can be viewed as a breach
of contract leading to litigation by project participants against the
government for losses suffered as a result of the change in rules. As such,
the use of a provincial royalty agreement or the use of a hybrid model may
be preferred if favourable royalty terms can be negotiated with the
provincial government in a timely and cost-effective manner. In that
25. Offshore Petroleum Royalty Regulations, N.S. Reg. 71/99.
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regard, negotiation of a royalty agreement is not an easy undertaking and
can take several years to complete.
8. Project Agreements
The documents referred to as "project agreements" constitute the con-
tractual framework the participants have negotiated among themselves
and with third parties (suppliers, contractors, customers, licensors of
technology, governments, etc.) for the purpose of carrying out the project.
They are discussed in more detail in Part V.
9. Security and Registration
Due to its non-recourse or limited recourse nature, project financing
relies heavily on the ability of a lender to obtain effective security against
project assets. Access to non-project corporate assets and revenues of
project participants, if it exists at all, may be limited to the pre-completion
phase. This section of the article discusses the project assets available for
lender security, the competing needs for security of project stakeholders
and the security registration systems applicable to the East Coast off-
shore.
Each offshore oil or gas development project has several classes of
assets available to secure project financing. These include (a) the produc-
tion licence, (b) the offshore production platform or vessel and related
facilities and equipment, both onshore and offshore, (c) the petroleum
substances produced from the project and the revenues derived from such
production, and (d) the bundle of intangible project-related rights created
under the various project agreements.
The project production licence, as noted earlier, is the fundamental
document of title giving its holders the right to produce petroleum
substances from the production licence area and title to the petroleum
substances produced. Without such licence there would be no project.
The project lender will want a security interest in the licence, as will the
province (to secure royalty obligations) and the project participants (to
secure joint account obligations). The province may insist on having a
first priority security interest in the project production licence and may
register that security interest by way of a security notice under the
registration system established by the Accord Acts. The province may
also insist that prior security interests be subordinated to its security. The
operator's lien is automatically given priority under the AccordActs over
other security interests unless specifically postponed, and the province
will require such postponement to be registered. In addition, the project
will require any prior security interests registered on behalf of the
participants or project lenders to be postponed in favour of the province's
security. Such postponement requirements will generally be set forth in
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the royalty agreement applicable to the province and may be a condition
of the participants having the benefit of the "royalty deal" provided for in
that royalty agreement.
The registration of a security interest by the province to secure royalty
obligations is unique to the East Coast offshore regimes. This approach
is not seen in western Canada. The reason for this unique situation is
two-fold. Under the Accords and their implementing legislation, the
provinces are the ultimate beneficiaries of offshore production royalties.
However, the production licence is not issued by the province and cannot
be cancelled by the province. The production licence is issued by the
relevant board. Failure to pay royalties is a ground for cancellation of the
licence, however, cancellation is a power exercised by the board, subject
only to approval by both the federal and provincial ministers. As such, the
province has no direct statutory enforcement powers to ensure payment
of royalties. Rather, the province must proceed under the payment
covenants and security provisions of the royalty agreement. Secondly,
the royalty agreement is usually a private contract between the province
and the project participants and falls outside the legislative scheme of the
Accord Acts themselves. This is true in the case of the Hibernia royalty
agreement, for example. Accordingly, failure to pay the contractual
royalty would not constitute a breach of the legislation. Thus, the usual
government statutory power to compel compliance with royalty obliga-
tions may not exist.
The Accord Acts establish a registration system for recording licence
holdings and security interests in relation to the various licences issued
under them, including the production licence. The Accord Acts also
establish a priorities scheme. The registration system was modelled, for
the most part, on the registration scheme established in Alberta for Crown
minerals under the Mines and Minerals Act.26 The registration system
allows for the registration of a limited number of instruments, namely
transfers, security notices, postponements, discharges of security notices
and assignments of security interests. As such, only two types of interests
are subject to the registration system, ownership interests in the licences
and security interests in the licences. Various other types of interests
common in the oil and gas industry are not covered, such as options,
farmout earning rights, overriding royalty interests and net profits inter-
ests. Unless the grantor's obligations in relation to such interests are
secured by the granting of a security interest in the applicable licence,
there is no effective means by which these interests can obtain recognition
through registration. Under the Accord Acts, registrable interests have
26. R.S.A. 1980, c. M-15.
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priority over other registrable interests according to the time of registra-
tion and have priority over non-registrable interests acquired after the
time of registration of the registrable interests. The Accord Acts do not
address priorities as between registrable interests and non-registrable
interests acquired prior to the time the registrable ones were registered.
Accordingly, the registration system is not a comprehensive one. It does
not address all interests that might exist in respect of the production
licence. As such, a project lender cannot rely on the registration system
to confirm the title of the project participants in the production licence.
A title opinion may be required by lender's counsel. This entails a
comprehensive review of the project participant's land and related
contract files and the title documents they contain, in order to establish a
good chain of title and determine the encumbrances and other burdens
affecting that title. In addition, the registration system does not apply to
any project assets other than the licences (i.e. exploration licences,
significant discovery licences and production licences) issued under the
Accord Acts.
Project assets, other than the production licence, will generally com-
prise various forms of tangible and intangible personal property and,
possibly, real property onshore. The participants' security and the project
lenders' security will be as broad as possible. The province's royalty
security will be more limited, but that is a matter of negotiation between
the participants and the province. The province's security for royalty
purposes, in addition to the production licence, may extend to the
proceeds of the sale of the production licence, to petroleum substances
produced from the project and the proceeds received from the sale of such
petroleum substances, and to the participants' interest in key project
agreements, such as the ownership and operating arrangements and
lifting and transportation agreements. We are not aware of any province
seeking a charge on hard project assets such as the production facilities.
The security needs of a province, the participants and project lenders
bring into play the operation of security legislation other than the Accord
Acts, at both the federal and provincial level. To the extent any onshore
real property forms part of the project assets, security in such property
will be dealt with under the applicable land titles or land registry system
in which such property is located. To the extent that project assets
comprise ships within the meaning of the Canada Shipping Act2F one
must look to the registration system created under that act for the
registration of ship's mortgages. What constitutes a ship for this purpose
is determined by that statute and includes certain offshore production
27. R.S.C. 1985, c. S-9.
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facilities. While the gravity-based production facility (GBS) used in the
Hibernia project does not constitute a ship for this purpose, the FPSO to
be used in the Terra Nova project does. Security against that facility will
have to be registered under the Canada ShippingAct. The bulk of security
registrations in respect of an offshore East Coast energy project, apart
from Accord Act registrations, will be governed by provincial security
legislation. This presents certain issues that project lenders must take into
consideration.
Property and civil rights within a province are matters that, constitu-
tionally, fall within the jurisdiction of the provinces. The offshore area
does not fall within the territorial boundaries of any province, and
provincial laws, in and of themselves, do not have extra-provincial effect.
Indeed, federal laws, unless expressly stated to do so, do not have
extra-territorial effect. This situation presented certain difficulties at the
outset of East Coast offshore development. At the outset of East Coast
production, there was, to a certain degree, a legal vacuum in the offshore
insofar as security legislation was involved. The Hibernia project and the
need for legal certainty in the offshore area spurred the federal govern-
ment into enacting a limited offshore personal property legal regime.
Selected federal and provincial statutes were extended to the Newfound-
land offshore area by way of the Hibernia Development Project Act.28
That Act enabled the extension of certain federal legislation and certain
provincial legislation to the Newfoundland offshore area. The regula-
tions29 under that Act extended to the Newfoundland offshore area the
federal Bank Act,30 Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act,3 Bills of Exchange
Act32 and Interest Act.33 In addition, the Newfoundland Assignment of
Book Debts Act, 4 the Bills ofSale Act,35 the Conditional Sales Act,36 the
Conveyancing Act37 and the Registration of Deeds Act 8 were extended
to the Newfoundland offshore area. This extension of federal and provin-
cial laws was generic in nature and, notwithstanding the name of the
enabling legislation, was applicable to all projects in the Newfoundland
offshore area, not just the Hibernia project. This extension of federal and
28. S.C. 1990, c. 41.
29. Hibernia Development Project Offshore Application Regulations, S.O.R.I190-774.
30. R.S.C. 1985, c. B-I, as rep. by S.C. 1991, c. 46, s. 604.
31. R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3.
32. R.S.C. 1985, c. B-4.
33. R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-15.
34. R.S.N. 1990, c. A-19, as rep. by Personal Property Security Act, S.N. 1990, c. P-7.1, s.
85 [hereinafter PPSA].
35. R.S.N. 1990, c. B-3, as rep. by PPSA, ibid.
36. R.S.N. 1990, c. C-28, as rep. by PPSA, ibid.
37. R.S.N. 1990, c. C-34.
38. R.S.N. 1990, c. R-10.
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provincial laws allowed for a "bare bones" personal property registration
regime for the Newfoundland offshore area. However, at the time, the
federal government was planning a more comprehensive extension of
federal and provincial law to the offshore. Shortly after the passage of the
Hibernia Development Project Act, Parliament enacted the Canadian
Laws Offshore Application Act,3 9 which provided for a much more
comprehensive legal regime for the offshore area and which was not
limited to the Newfoundland offshore area. This statute has now been
incorporated as part of the Oceans Act.4° The Oceans Act provides the
current basis on which federal and provincial security legislation can be
fully extended to the offshore area. This is essential in order that
provincial governments, project participants and project lenders are able
to perfect their security in relation to a wide range of project assets,
including offshore installations and produced petroleum substances that,
in many instances, may never be landed onshore Canada.
The Oceans Act provides for the establishment of a property and civil
rights legal system for the offshore area and gives the courts of the coastal
provinces jurisdiction in relation to the offshore to the same extent as if
such area was located within the province. Both Nova Scotia and
Newfoundland have enacted modern personal property security legisla-
tion.4 However, the extension of provincial security legislation to the
offshore area remains to be completed. In order for provincial laws to
have application, regulations must be enacted under the Oceans Act
prescribing the areas of the offshore area to which provincial laws apply.
Such regulations have yet to be promulgated. This leaves Nova Scotia
without a proper personal property security registration system in respect
of its offshore area and leaves Newfoundland with the old one established
under the Hibernia Development Project Act. Accordingly, the security
registration system for the East Coast offshore remains to be completed
and may be problematic for project lenders wishing to perfect their
security interest in project assets.
39. S.C. 1990, c. 44, as rep. by OceansAct, S.C. 1996, c. 31, s. 54.
40. S.C. 1996, c. 31.
41. Personal Property Security Act, S.N.S. 1995-96, c. 13 and Personal Property Security
Act, S.N. 1998, c. P-7.1.
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V. Project Agreements
The typical project will have a variety of project agreements that, against
the backdrop of the general legal and regulatory regime applicable to the
project, constitute the private ordering the participants have fashioned in
respect of the project.42 This contractual framework allocates risks
between the parties involved in the project and creates the initial risk
profile that potential project lenders will address.43 The typical catego-
ries of agreement one encounters in such a project include:
1. Implementation Arrangements
These govern the relationship and arrangements between the govern-
ments having legal authority over the project and the participants, to the
extent it goes beyond the general legal and regulatory framework appli-
cable to all parties in the region where the project is carried out. They may
be reflected in agreements with some or all of these governments
(supplemented by legislation to effectuate some of the commitments
made by the governments), in a production licence or in some similar
authority or interest granted under a regulatory or jointly administered
regime. Enforceability of these arrangements may be an issue because of
the nature of a parliamentary democracy (discussed in more detail
below). In such circumstances the goal of the participant will be to
increase the threshold of political inconvenience to depart from the
arrangement - through so-called "stability" clauses or provisions for
compensation by government to the participants if there are changes in
the arrangement as a result of the actions of the government or for which
it may have or accept responsibility.
A project financing may give the project lenders the right to step into
the shoes of a defaulting participant insofar as such arrangements are
concerned.
In its usual sense, an implementation arrangement sets out the rights
and benefits to be received by the participants from the host governments
with respect to the project (the right to undertake the project, land and land
use rights, regulatory, tax, fiscal, customs, import and export benefits,
government support for the participants and the project generally and
other exemptions or approvals to facilitate the project) and the commit-
ments the participants make in return for those (time frame for com-
mencement and completion of project, commitments in terms of capital,
42. As Hoffman observes, "Because the ability of the project sponsor to produce revenue from
project operation is the foundation of a project financing, the contracts constitute the framework
for project viability and control the allocation of risks." Hoffman, supra note 1 at 7.
43. Vinter, supra note 1 at 23.
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expertise, regional benefits, financing arrangements, or supervisory
arrangements, for example). In the offshore area, such arrangements may
be found in the development plan approval, the production licence or in
agreements between the participants and responsible governments with
respect to the fiscal and other aspects of the legal regime applicable to the
project.
2. Ownership and Operating Agreements
These are the agreements that define the relationships among the partici-
pants (including government or government agency participants, if any),
whether in the context of a joint venture, a partnership, a limited
partnership, a project corporation, an alliance or otherwise. There are two
classes of relations that such agreements deal with.
(1) Entity structure and governance: If ajoint venture corporation or
project corporation is used, the internal governance arrangements
will be found in the underlying constating documents such as the
memorandum, articles, by-laws or shareholder agreements.
(2) Participants' relations: The rights and obligations governing the
relationship among the participants for the purposes of the
project are usually found in a joint venture agreement, a
development and operating agreement, an ownership agreement
or a combination of some or all of these.
Typically, participants will own an offshore project in undivided
interests. Almost invariably, offshore energy projects are structured as
joint ventures. The cost and risk of offshore exploration is usually
mitigated by participants forming joint ventures at the exploration stage.
Operating agreements or pre-development agreements entered into at
this stage focus on exploration activities such as seismic work and
drilling. These agreements do not normally address development and
production operations in a meaningful way. Generally, a far more specific
and sophisticated agreement is necessary once a commercial discovery is
made and development activities are planned. Such agreement will
supersede earlier operating agreements but carry forward the joint
venture arrangement in one form or another. The reason for joint
venturing is as compelling, if not more so, at the development stage. At
this stage, capital costs are enormous. East Coast offshore projects such
as Hibernia, Sable and Terra Nova entail the expenditure of billions of
dollars prior to first production. The size of the expenditures, completion
risk, reservoir risk, production risk and commodity price risk almost
mandate ajoint venture structure, as few participants are willing to make
such expenditures and expose themselves to such risks on their own.
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To date East Coast joint ventures have taken two forms. One form is
the traditional joint venture where the participants establish a
non-incorporated joint venture. This is a contractual arrangement whereby
the parties enter into a joint venture to develop and operate the project.
Participants may or may not establish special purpose vehicles to partici-
pate, as working interest owners, in the joint venture. These special
purpose vehicles may be corporations or partnerships. The choice of
vehicle is driven by tax and liability issues particular to the individual
participant. In this form, the project is operated by one of the participants,
or an affiliate of such participant, on behalf of all participants. The second
form involves the creation of a special purpose corporation. This corpo-
ration acts as operator of the project and holds project assets as a bare
trustee on behalf of the participants. In other words, project assets remain
beneficially owned by the project participants. Such corporations carry
on business on a flow-through basis such that they neither make a profit
nor suffer a loss. The operating agreement is accompanied by or incorpo-
rates a form of unanimous shareholders agreement. Each participant
holds voting shares in the project company in the same proportion as its
underlying undivided working interest in the project and the production
licence. In either case, the joint venture will be managed by an executive,
management or operating committee representing all the participants,
with each participant having a voting interest equal to its percentage
working interest in the project. All major decisions affecting the project
will be taken at this level. Such decisions include, among others, budget
approval, major asset acquisitions and contracts and changes to the
development plan for the project. Day-to-day execution of the project is
carried out by the operator in a manner consistent with the decisions,
instructions, guidelines and directives established by such committee.
Regardless of the form chosen, the underlying operating, development
and shareholding arrangements provide, exhaustively, for the respective
rights and obligations of the project participants. The matters addressed
in these agreements may include
(a) a description of the project that is the subject of the agreement;
(b) a statement of the respective beneficial ownership in the project
of each of the participants;
(c) the establishment of an executive, management or operating
committee to oversee the operation of the project and govern the
participants' relations in respect of the project;
(d) the appointment of an operator to conduct day-to-day operations
of the project and a description of the duties and authorities of the
operator in relation to project operations;
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(e) the nature of the participants' obligations in relation to the project
- separate and limited to their respective individual interest
shares of project obligations and liabilities or joint;
(f) the establishment of a funding mechanism by way of cash call,
invoicing, zero balance banking or other procedure whereby
each participant is liable for its undivided share of project
expenditures;
(g) the commitments of the participants to the project and the degree
to which a participant's liability for project expenditures is
non-recourse, limited recourse or full recourse;
(h) the period the project relationship among the participants will
last;
(i) the creation of an operator's lien or inter-participant security or
both to secure payment by project participants of their share of
project expenditures;
(j) default and remedy provisions, including the obligations, if any,
of other participants to make good the default of a participant;
(k) rights, if any, of participants to withdraw from the project;
(1) restrictions, if any, on dispositions (broadly defined) of interests
in the project;
(in) abandonment and decommissioning obligations of the partici-
pants;
(n) force majeure provisions;
(o) dispute resolution mechanisms; and
(p) if appropriate in the circumstances, unitization and reserves
redetermination provisions.
3. Regional Benefits
Agreements or commitments may be entered into by the participants with
governments that contain understandings between those parties with
respect to giving the participants preference to local suppliers/state
concerns.
4. Sponsor Agreements
These deal with the relationship between a participant and its sponsor for
the purposes of the project and may involve the provision of guarantees
or other forms of support from those sponsors to the other participants.
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5. Engineering Agreements
These may be entered into with different parties dealing with front-end,
design and detailed engineering for the project. Alternatively, they may
be part of the services provided by a contractor or an alliance to the project
and subsumed under agreements governing those services.
6. Construction or Construction, Management and Operating
Agreements
These may include agreements dealing with all aspects of engineering,
procurement and construction for the project as well as ancillary docu-
mentation (tenders, bid bonds, performance bonds, labour and material
payment bonds), subcontracts, supplier agreements (goods and services,
utilities, feedstock), procurement agreements, and purchase orders. The
actual construction arrangements may be carried out through a variety of
compensation arrangements including a fixed-price turnkey contract,
unit price, cost-plus or an alliance contract.44
7. Managing Contractor Agreement
This details the roles, relationship and responsibilities between the
participants and a managing contractor with respect to some or all of the
project design, engineering, procurement and construction. It is an
alternative form of construction arrangement in which the managing
contractor oversees the participants' interests in a series of engineering,
procurement and construction contracts between the participants and
contractors.
8. Alliance Agreement
These govern the relationship among members of an alliance in respect
of the project. Alliancing is an alternative to the more traditional forms
of contracting. Generally, an alliance consists of a group of contractors
who share a common project execution philosophy with the owners
(sponsors) of the project. It will usually have an integrated management
team drawn from owners, the operator and contractor organizations on a
best-person-for-the-position basis. The alliance is responsible for project
management activities and the project execution phase. All parties in the
alliance work collectively on modifications or changes required to
improve the project through a consultative approach to developing
common project goals and objectives, eliminating project inefficiencies,
and risk identification and analysis. The profit element of the contractor
44. Ibid. at 45. See also J. Jenkins, "Contract Structure and Risk Allocation in Major
Infrastructure Projects" (1994) 11 Int'l Constr. L. Rev. 489 at 442-46; and J.G. Mauel,
"Common Contractual Risk Allocations In International Power Projects" [ 1996] Colum. Bus.
L. Rev. 37 at 42-46.
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members of the alliance is at risk to cover a portion of cost overruns
(generally up to a certain limit), and the same members are entitled to
receive payments calculated as a share of the cost savings (generally
without any limit) if the cost of the work comes in under an agreed target
price or in some cases ahead of schedule. Executive leadership comes
from an alliance board made up of representatives from alliance contrac-
tors and owners.
Some alliances adopt a two-tier contractual approach with a separate
"works" contract for a particular scope of work area of the work relating to
the project together with an overriding alliance agreement. Usually the
"works" contracts set forth the respective scopes of work and related
responsibilities, payment provisions, owner rights and obligations relating
to suspension and termination for convenience, and default provisions. In
addition, the "works" contracts may provide a fallback if the alliance is
terminated. The alliance agreement itself usually provides an umbrella
protocol dealing with project management, project goals and objectives,
target cost and schedule, risk sharing, and final cost calculation.
In other alliances the alliance agreement is a single document (though
composed of many parts) that establishes the framework for the alliance
with individual work packages performed by one or more alliance
contractors pursuant to that general framework.
Alliance behaviour focuses on a single "best for project" culture for the
project, a clear set of goals and objectives, a design basis and design intent
that is clear and accepted by all participants, an initial scope allocation for
the "works" that is clearly defined, and "minimum conditions" for the
acceptance of the project that are clear and accepted by all participants.
Most alliances involve a target schedule and a target cost, against which
the actual performance of the alliance will be measured to determine the
risk/reward sharing. The target cost will be developed on an "open book"
basis, with appropriate opportunities for challenges.
Payment for work under the alliance contract is usually made on a cost
reimbursable basis with a reasonable uplift for profit and overhead. The
alliance contractors participate in the "upside" and the "downside" of the
project performance in relation to the agreed targets through a "risk/
reward" or "performance contracting" formula.
9. Supply Contracts
These may relate to products, services, materials, equipment, labour,
feedstock or utilities that are required to carry out the design, engineering,
construction, development and operation of the project. 45 They contain
the terms on which things that are required during the construction or
45. Vinter, supra note 1 at 66.
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operating phases will be made available to the project. There may be a
variety of support arrangements (such as guarantees, bonds, letters of
credit, etc.) entered into with respect to critical areas of supply.
10. Common Facilities Agreements
Where the project or its participants share facilities with other projects
there may be agreements that relate to the entitlement, and terms on
which, to use those common facilities. These can relate to common power
or utility sources, warehousing or support services, transportation facili-
ties and the like. To the extent the use of the common facilities is a critical
part of constructing or operating the project or getting its production to
market it will be important to the project lenders.
11. Technology Licensing Agreements
A major offshore energy project or facility often involves cutting edge
technology. The persons that own that technology will generally require
detailed agreements relating to the licensing and use of it, dealing with
such matters as the type of licence and the rights it grants, provisions for
acknowledgement and protection of the intellectual property rights of the
owner, compensation for use, restrictions on use, rights to improvements,
indemnities for third party claims, process or performance guarantees,
confidentiality obligations, remedies for breach, dispute-resolution pro-
visions and the like. The ownership and right to use technology or
intellectual property developed in the course of a major offshore project
may be dealt with on a project-wide basis in various forms of agreements
and, particularly in the alliance contest, there may be some interesting
variations on the usual reservation of intellectual property rights by the
owners of technology participating in the project.
12. Operating and Maintenance Agreement
This is the agreement among the participants and perhaps with an
operating entity, to operate the project.46 It may be subsumed in an
ownership and operating agreement or a construction, management and
operating agreement.
13. Financing Agreements
These deal with arrangements among the participants for the provision of
equity through capital share subscriptions, or other forms of contribution.
Often a zero balance banking facility is used. There may also be
agreements dealing with third-party financing for the project (including
banks, governments or private parties), such as credit facility agreements,
loan agreements or financing facilities agreements.
46. Ibid. at 60.
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14. Security Agreements
There may be a variety of security agreements, including debentures
(fixed and floating charge) and specific security (such as assignments of
production and revenues; pledges of shares in an operating or project
corporation; specific charges on land and equipment; and security trust
agreements or trust indentures).
15. Credit Support
There may also be agreements from other persons providing credit
enhancement to the lenders or other parties involved in the project. These
may take the form of guarantees, indemnities, letters of credit, bonds,
surety agreements, comfort letters, sponsor agreements, equity commit-
ments, completion assurances, operating cost undertakings, or backstop
arrangements.47
16. Inter-Creditor Agreements
In addition to the agreements entered into with the project lenders
reflecting the loan facility, security and arrangements between the project
lenders and third parties relating to security, credit enhancements and
other arrangements, there will no doubt be a series of inter-secured-
parties' agreements in place among the project lenders and other parties
holding security in respect of the project. These agreements will princi-
pally deal with the relationship between the respective security interests
of these secured parties, including information sharing among them and
to co-ordination among these secured parties in enforcement and realiza-
tion scenarios. The agreements generally provide for an acknowledgement
of the security of the various secured parties, priority arrangements with
respect to the allocation of proceeds of realization, agreements not to
dispute each other's security, exchange of information concerning agree-
ments held by the secured parties relating to the project together with any
amendments to those agreements that might have a materially adverse
affect upon the other parties' security or their rights to realize or enforce
it (perhaps with certain consent requirements), and exchange of informa-
tion concerning the state of accounts of the borrowers under the facilities
secured by the respective parties' securities. The inter-secured-parties'
agreements may also provide for rights to cure defaults under a secured
facility including a right to pay out the defaulted facility.
47. Ibid. at 169. See also Hoffman, supra note 1 at 403-45; and Rauner, supra note 1 at 168-76.
For a recent discussion of surety policies as credit support in project financing situations see
Standard & Poor's, "Surety Policies as Mechanisms for Timely Credit Support in Project
Finance Transactions" Infrastructure Finance (28 June 2000).
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The inter-secured-parties' agreements also generally provide for con-
sultation among the secured parties if a default occurs or is anticipated to
occur under one or more of the various facilities governing secured
arrangements with the borrower, and for notice of intention to take steps
pursuant to their security and its realization. There may also be provision
for joint action in respect of notices of assignments and directions to pay
to debtors of the borrower, and for agreement upon a realization or
enforcement agent, as well as provisions for co-ordination between the
secured parties with respect to realization on the disposition of the
collateral provided by the borrower.
Parties who may be involved in the inter-secured-parties arrangements
include governments (where they have secured interests under financial
assistance arrangements or royalty arrangements), other owners (in
respect of their secured arrangements, if any, under the underlying
ownership and operating agreements), lenders in respect of project
financing, other secured facilities and the like.
17. Lifting Agreements
These contain the terms and conditions on which the owners lift their
respective shares of production from an offshore development project.
The ownership and operating arrangements among the participants
will typically provide that each participant has the right and obligation to
separately take in kind and dispose of its share of production. The lifting
and transportation arrangements determine how this will be done. Hibernia
and Terra Nova are both crude oil projects. The Sable project is a gas
project. Different considerations apply to each type. In an oil project, the
lifting rights as between participants will be the subject of negotiation and
agreement among the participants. While each participant has an undi-
vided interest in the project, it will not have an undivided interest in each
barrel of crude oil produced. Rather, production is batched such that each
participant is allotted the petroleum produced during a specified interval.
The length and frequency of intervals allotted to participants is a function
of their relative working interests. Participants with large working
interests will have more frequent liftings than those with small working
interests. In this context, liftings means the right to take delivery of
petroleum substances produced from the project and in storage.
Issues such as the nature of the obligation to lift, provisions among
participants as to liftings (including administration, scheduling and
coordination of liftings) liabilities in connection with liftings or failures
to lift and events that affect the nature and quantity of lifting will all be
dealt with under lifting agreements. They will also deal with measure-
ment of the quantity and quality of the production lifted. Individual
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owners may have the right to combine or exchange their liftings in order
to facilitate efficient utilization of available shipping capacity.
To the extent that a government has a right to take in kind its royalty
share there may also be lifting arrangements in place between the
government and the owners of the project.
18. Transportation Arrangements
Production from offshore projects must be transported to market by
tanker or pipeline. There is no offshore pipeline serving the Hibernia or
Terra Nova projects. Each project has limited offshore storage capacity,
at the GBS in the case of Hibernia and at the FPSO in the case of Terra
Nova. Taking delivery of crude oil at these facilities is not a routine
matter. At present there are very few crude oil tankers in the world that
can do this. To accommodate the transportation needs of these projects,
a three-vessel fleet of specialized shuttle tankers and a transshipment
terminal in Newfoundland have been developed to date. There will be
ownership or chartering arrangements in place pursuant to which the
vessels can be made available to the project and transportation, pooling
capacity reservation, charterparty and other agreements to make capacity
on the vessels available to the participants in the projects. Vessel
administration agreements will govern the terms on which the individual
vessels will be operated and maintained. These vessels will take delivery
of crude oil produced from the projects and either deliver the crude
directly to market or to the NTL transshipment facility at Whiffenhead,
Newfoundland for storage and transshipment. Crude oil delivered to
Whiffenhead will subsequently be transported to market by second leg
tankers in the world fleet. Arrangements will be in place between the
participant shipping crude from Whiffenhead and the owners or operators
of the second leg tankers to govern this use of the vessels.
19. User Arrangements
If the project financing involves a facility such as a pipeline or transship-
ment terminal, the nature and quality of commitments from users of the
facility will be important elements in assessing its feasibility from a
project financing standpoint. Are they firm commitments at a determin-
able price for a definite term? What conditions, if any, attach to the
obligations to use the facility? Are they take-or-pay or take-and-pay
contracts? What backstopping arrangements are in place?
20. Marketing Arrangements
There may, in some offshore projects, be some form of marketing
arrangements among the participants. Alternatively, each participant
may be entitled (and required) to lift its share of production from the
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project and market it, without reference to the other participants, under its
own marketing arrangements.
21. Offtake Arrangements
These are arrangements with third-party purchasers (or affiliates of the
participants in some cases) to take production from the project at
quantities, quality and on terms as to price, delivery and risk specified in
the offtake agreement. Pricing may be determined on a spot-market basis
or may be calculated by reference to published pricing manuals. It may
also involve a net-back concept tied to the price ultimately realized by the
party taking the production but allowing for deduction of costs of
realizing that price. The obligation under the offtake agreement may be
take-or-pay, take-and-pay or some other form of commitment of the
purchaser to specified quantities of product on specified terms.48
In the case of offshore oil projects, crude produced from the project
will either be sold to a third party for cash or will be refined by an affiliate
of the participant in its own refinery and then sold in the marketplace. In
the first instance, crude oil will typically be sold on a spot basis or
pursuant to short-term (i.e. thirty-day) evergreen contracts.
In the case of a gas project, gas may be sold on a spot basis or pursuant
to short- or long-term purchase contracts. Again, the mix will depend on
the participant's view of the gas market and the degree to which the
participant has contracted for long-term, firm transportation capacity on
the pipeline. That, in turn, is a function of the degree to which the
financing for the pipeline requires long-term, firm service agreements to
backstop the pipeline financing.
49
22. Hedging Arrangements
These may deal with commodity price, interest rates or currency, and are
generally implemented by individual participants to protect against
fluctuations in these areas during the project.5 0 There may be arrange-
ments in place to manage commodity price risk or provide some sort of
price protection through forward sales of production or other arrange-
ments such as options. In some cases, these are entered into to lock in the
returns for production from the project at what are then perceived to be
favourable prices. In other cases they are more a form of "floor"
48. Vinter, ibid. at 24,39. See also D.G. Waddingham, "Financing Canadian Offshore Oil and
Gas Projects" in Financing Canada 1 417 at 436-37.
49. For a discussion of financeability issues in relation to gas sales agreements and gas
projects generally, see P. Roberts, "Bankable Gas Sales Agreements in the Project Financing
of Offshore Gas Production Projects" (1998) 16 J. Energy & Nat. Res. L. 200.
50. Rauner, supra note 1 at 179-80.
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protection for commodity pricing on production from the project. To the
extent they affect returns from the project they will be a key issue for the
project lenders.
23. Project Insurance Program
The project insurance program will be a key part of the project financing
arrangements during both the construction and the operating phases of the
project. The nature and content of the program, provisions for lenders'
review of and satisfaction with the program, distribution of proceeds in
a way that will satisfy the lenders' security concerns, limitations on
subrogation and other rights, approval rights with respect to insurers and
coverage and changes in the insurance program will all be important to
the project lenders.51 Lenders will typically require confirmation of the
program coverage at the outset of their involvement in the project and
notice of any change in or proposed cancellation of all or part of the
insurance. In some cases, an independent insurance consultant may
review and confirm to the project lenders the reasonableness of the
project insurance program. The lenders will want to be satisfied that the
insurance program is adequate (having regard to coverage, exclusions,
limits and deductibles) to provide protection to the participants for
foreseeable loss of assets or third-party liabilities as a result of perils
normally covered by insurance. There may, with some owners, be self-
insurance arrangements and the individual owners may endorse their own
liability insurance programs to provide excess limits coverage on a
contingency basis.
Most project insurance programs will involve course-of-construction
insurance, property damage coverage, comprehensive general liability
and perhaps insurance against business interruption. It may also involve
<delay in start-up or pollution insurance. 2 The project insurance
program on an offshore project may be taken out through the operator,
with individual owners being able to supplement this common facility
with their own individual programs.
The relationship of the project lenders to the project insurers will be
different depending on whether the project financing is for the entire
project or the interest of an individual owner. In the former situation,
project lenders may require that they be added as co-insurers, as their
interest may appear, with appropriate loss payable directives to allocate
proceeds of the insurance, on an agreed basis, between the lenders and the
owners insured. Alternatively, all insurance proceeds may be payable to
the security trustee for the lenders, who will allocate it on an agreed basis.
51. Vinter, supra note 1 at 173-86.
52. Ibid. at 173.
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The arrangements between the project lenders and the borrowers with
respect to insurance often deal with the construction and operating phases
of the project separately.53 The owners may agree to effect a minimum
coverage acceptable to the lenders during the construction phase, with a
stated objective, such as insuring the owners' interest in the project to a
maximum probable loss. Property damage coverage may be an agreed
minimum based on the project loans outstanding. Other obligations as to
coverage may be stated in terms of reputable insurers and coverage of an
amount and extent that is in accordance with industry standards appropri-
ate to a project of the size and characteristics of the project, perhaps with
a reference to it being carried out by participants of a similar financial
standing to the owners involved in similar projects in that area.
54
24. Royalties
In the offshore area, a provincial government may have a secured royalty
interest that takes priority over the project lenders' security. Despite the
fact that this royalty interest may be based on contract rather than
legislation, the lenders may be prepared to recognize it as a cost of the
production right in the first place, notwithstanding the very different
nature of a production licence and these royalty interests from the Crown
lease under Western Canadian mineral regimes.
25. Escrow Agreement
In circumstances where a number of the contractual or legal arrangements
come into place at different times but there is a reluctance on the part of
participants or lenders or governments to commit themselves. to particu-
lar contractual, legislative, regulatory or administrative provisions until
other elements of the project are in place, an escrow arrangement may be
entered into to give the parties comfort that all their requirements will be
met before some of the various arrangements contemplated become
binding and effective. The document will usually attempt a road map of
the inter-related obligations and commitments, a detailed listing of third-
party actions required to satisfy conditions precedent, perhaps some
indication as to responsibilities of the parties in obtaining those, and a
process for confirmation as to the acceptability to the parties of the steps
taken to satisfy the various requirements described in the agreement.
53. As Vinter notes, ibid. at 180, this is because the two phases involve different insurers.
54. Ibid.
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VI. Structuring a Project Financing
Project lenders typically consider a project financing proposal from
the standpoint of the project's initial feasibility, the risks that could
threaten its continued viability (i. e. the likelihood of repayment) and what
can be done, consistent with the goals of the participants, to reduce these
risks to a level the lenders find acceptable.5 This has been referred to as
the "bankability" of the project - the acceptability or otherwise of a
project's structure as the basis of a project financing. Lenders will want
to ensure that (a) they are comfortable with the overall risk profile of the
project, subject to the credit enhancements they are able to obtain in
respect of it; (b) they are not bearing risks that are properly those of the
parties having the benefit of the project's upside potential (so-called
"equity risks" rather than "debt risks"); (c) there are no foreseeable costs
- capital or operating - that have not been taken into account; and (d)
the projected cash flows from the project are acceptable for the purpose
of debt service, repayment and operations and appear to be reliable.56
In structuring the project itself, the participants will consider and
determine a number of issues:
(a) How will the assets that constitute the project be held and what,
if any, are the rights of the participants among themselves with
respect to the design, engineering, construction, procurement
and operation of those assets?
(b) What sort of governance arrangements will exist among the
participants with respect to decision-making and commitments
in relation to the project?
(c) What sort of entity will be used by the participants to carry out
the project? What will be the arrangements for governance of
that entity and how will those relate to the inter-participant
governance arrangements?
55. Rauner, supra note 1 at 158. Waddingham suggests, supra note 48 at 425, "The objective
is to design a financial package that reduces the sponsoring companies' risk while presenting
the lenders with sufficient credit support." Wynant states, supra note I at 170: "The lenders
must be provided with complete, detailed estimates of the project's risks and return potential,
including feasibility studies, engineering reports, and particulars of commitments by the
contractors, suppliers, and customers."
56. Mills, supra note 2 at 306; See Vinter's list of "sacred cows", supra note 1 at 86-87. For
a discussion of the quantitative economic evaluation techniques applied by commercial
bankers see S. Mills, "Project Financing of Oil and Gas Field Developments: Balancing the
Interests of Investors and Lenders" (1996) 11 J. Int'l Bank. L. 24.
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(d) What are the risks attendant on the project construction and
operating and what are the range and likelihood of adverse
consequences as a result of those risks occurring?57
(e) What means are available to deal with the risks?
(f) What sources of financing are available with respect to the
project, will the participants access these on a common or an
individual basis, and on what terms (including required support
or enhancement arrangements) are they available?
(g) What tax, fiscal, accounting, business and legal (liability) con-
siderations are relevant to the project and the participants and
how do those affect the proposed arrangements?58
In the course of, or as a preliminary to, developing these arrangements,
the participants may, individually or jointly, carry out feasibility and
other studies to determine the technical, financial and legal viability of the
project. 9 Often, an important part of this investigation of the feasibility
of the project will involve financial advisors who are retained by and
work with the participants to develop optimum project structures and
arrangements with an eye to eventually accessing the banking or capital
markets for project financing.
The financial advisors' role will vary from project to project, but they
generally provide a financing perspective in the negotiations of the
project agreements and in the development and articulation of the
technical and commercial features of the project. Their role may involve
a review and analysis of the existing or contemplated project guarantees
or other credit supports, developing an understanding of the financial
circumstances and objectives of the participants (individually or collec-
tively), as well as a review of the economic and fiscal circumstances
relevant to the project including applicable legal and regulatory regimes
and markets for the product or service that results from the project. The
advisors will try to guide the participants to the most effective structure
57. Wynant, supra note 1 at 167.
58. As Rauner notes, supra note 1 at 156: "The specific techniques used in project financing
have varied from project to project, but several important steps (not necessarily in the following
order) are typically involved. These include (1) analysis and appraisal of the technical,
financial and legal viability of the proposed project (including analysis of all of the project
risks); (2) establishment of some separate borrowing entity - a subsidiay, nominee corpora-
tion, jointly-owned corporation, general partnership, limited partnership, joint venture or trust
- that will carry out the project; (3) selection of appropriate vehicles and methods for financing;
(4) structuring and negotiation of arrangements between sponsors, lenders and interested third
parties to support the debt, including insurance schemes and a wide variety of direct, indirect,
contingent and implied covenants and guarantees; and (5) identification, maximization and
allocation of tax benefits that accrue to the project."
59. Ibid.
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for project finance in terms of tax, accounting, business and legal
considerations.
The efforts of the financial advisors may lead to an information
memorandum or some other document that describes the project and its
characteristics relevant to a project financing. The actual structuring of
financing alternatives would consist of (a) an assessment of the available
alternatives and their sources in terms of lending institutions, capital
markets and private funding; (b) developing a financing strategy for the
project in terms of an optimal capital structure (equity versus debt); (c)
recommendations on the financial markets to access and the terms on
which financing from those markets would be achievable; and (d) an
assessment of the necessary government and regulatory approvals, envi-
ronmental considerations, pre-engineering, engineering, procurement
and construction status and project documentation.
VII. Risk Analysis
A key element of the negotiations relating to a project financing involve
efforts to deal with the risks in carrying out the project. When we speak of
"risks" in a project we mean adverse things that can occur in relation to the
project (suffering a harm or loss) and the loss or expense incurred if they
do occur. Risks can be categorized in a number of ways including the area
of project activity where the risk occurs such as design, construction,
operation, financing, marketing or transportation; or the harm that creates
the risk such as political events, force majeure, design error, professional
negligence, cost overruns, technological deficiencies or operational error.
Ariskanalysis of a project may involve consideration of the following:
(a) What needs to be done to complete the project?
(b) What will it cost, directly (actual cash outlays) or indirectly
(currency and interest rate fluctuations)?
(c) How long will it take to complete the project and achieve start-up?
(d) If the project is completed what revenues will it produce?
(e) What will it cost to operate the project continuously to produce
these revenues?
(f) How will costs of constructing and operating the project be fi-
nanced?
(g) How will tax and other fiscal obligations in various jurisdictions
affect the revenues from the project?
(h) What is the risk that something that must be done to complete or
operate the project or to produce the revenues for the parties entitled
to them under the ownership, financing or operating arrangements:
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(i) is not done, through the default of a party or because of
circumstances preventing it that are beyond the parties'
control;
(ii) is not done properly (from a design, workmanship or
regulatory standpoint) and does not achieve the purpose
intended;
(iii) costs more than expected;
(iv) takes longer than expected;
(v) is done in a way that causes loss or damage to other parties;
(vi) is done in a way that gives rise to government or regulatory
sanction;
(vii) is not able to benefit the participants because of political or
civil actions or unrest; or
(viii) is damaged or destroyed by causes beyond the control of
the parties?
It has been suggested that there are three basic approaches to dealing with
risk: 60
(a) Reduction: through steps to remove or reduce the risk.
(b) Allocation: through agreements to share or allocate responsibil-
ity for the risk between parties under the terms of their contractual
arrangements.
(c) Hedging or insurance: through using other parties' obligations in
relation to the risk to reduce its effects on the project or the
participants.
All of these must be considered in light of their cost, effectiveness and
other consequences.
VIII. Project Risks
The project finance lenders' basic concern is whether the project can be
constructed on schedule and operated at a cost to produce the revenues
that will service and repay the project financing in accordance with their
financial models. Delays in completion or increased costs of design,
engineering, construction, marketing or transportation (whether through
changes or otherwise) will affect the cost of the financing required. In a
fixed price turnkey construction contract situation, much of the construc-
tion risk may be shifted to the contractor, subject to the adequacy and
enforceability of recourse against the contractor or its third-party credit
60. Ibid. at 161.
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support. In an alliance contract situation, a risk/reward sharing arrange-
ment gives the owners and contractors a common interest in the project
coming in under budget and ahead of schedule through a shared partici-
pation in savings or overruns, and possibly through a shared participation
in the profits or production from operating the project. Once start-up and
commissioning have occurred, the risks then relate to the successful
operation, transportation and marketing of production required to ensure
cash flow for cost recovery, servicing debt and a return on equity. We next
discuss eighteen types of risk affecting a project.
1. Credit
The credit strength of the participants or the project sponsors will be a
significant factor in assessing the project's practicality from a lender's
standpoint, whether that credit strength becomes relevant in the context
of various risk enhancement devices (such as limited or other guarantees,
or usage or offtake commitments) by those sponsors or in the context of
assessing the sponsors' commitment to the project through equity contri-
butions (including overrun commitments).6
In circumstances where the commitment of each participant to fund
construction is limited to a share of costs and liabilities equivalent to its
separate undivided interest in the project, lenders will have to weigh each
participant's creditworthiness separately and consider the legal or prac-
tical obligation of the other participants to complete the project if one of
the participants does not or cannot fund its share of these costs. The
participants' commitment to fund may be unlimited, it may be tied to a
minimum obligation (perhaps one intended to ensure the economic
drivers militate in favour of completion once it has been reached), it may
be tied to a project authority for expenditure (AFE) with some voting
procedure for additional or supplementary AFEs, or it may be for a
budgeted amount and a specified percentage of overruns in relation to that
budgeted amount (perhaps with some voting procedure required to
engage the overrun obligation). If the actual participants in the project are
affiliates of other more substantial entities, there may be guarantees or
other forms of support from the parent organization to consider.
2. Commercial and Financial Viability
The project's commercial and financial feasibility must be acceptable to
the lenders. This may involve economic modelling of project costs and
revenues, assessment of the technology and facilities requirements of the
project, evaluation of the sources of materials and labour required for
construction and operation, sources of funding for that construction and
61. Ibid. at 158.
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operation, the available resources and commitments from markets for the
product or services the project will provide and the method of getting the
product to market or engaging users of these services, the experience and
expertise of the participants, the sponsors and persons involved in the
construction and operation of the project. 2 The lenders' evaluation of the
sponsors will address several levels - their technical capacity and
competence to manage the project, their financial commitment to the
project and their technical and financial depth as a backstop to the project
should it encounter difficulties.63
3. Reserve
The risk that reserves recoverable from the reservoirs included in the
project will not be sufficient to pay the debt and debt service costs is
generally borne by the lenders. Lenders will normally have the benefit of
detailed reserve and petroleum engineering reports on the proposed
project. 64 Because of the lenders' reluctance to accept risks that they feel
should properly be borne by those having the benefit of the upside of a
project's success - the equity providers - lenders will often not lend
against anything other than proven reserves that can be demonstrated to
be commercially recoverable, and then only on the basis of a very
conservative repayment schedule that contemplates repayment well
before full depletion of the reserves. 65 A production history for the
62. Ibid. at 159; Vinter, supra note 1 at 85.
63. Mills, supra note 2 at 307.
64. Mills, ibid. at 306 notes:
It is normal for a prospective borrower to submit to potential bank lenders detailed
reservoir and petroleum engineering reports on the development to be undertaken.
These reports will in particular: (1) describe the exploration and appraisal work carried
out on the field or fields to be developed and classify the reserves of hydrocarbons
contained in the field(s) into categories depending on their likelihood of recovery. Thus
a banker would expect to see a classification into proven reserves (or 'P90 reserves' -
the likelihood of recovering exceeding the stated figure is deemed to be 90 per cent),
probable reserves (or 'P50 reserves' - ultimate recovery is 50 per cent likely to be either
greater or less than the stated value) and possible reserves; (2) detail the development
work to be undertaken and set out the cost and phasing of the works required; (3) provide
projections relating to the anticipated production rates of individual wells over time
('production profiles'), the associated operating and maintenance costs expected and all
additional fixed and variable costs to be incurred, including estimates of abandonment
costs.
65. Ibid. at 307. Waddingham, supra note 48 at 426, notes that reserve categories other than
proven producing "such as proved developed non-producing, may be incorporated in the
technical analysis but their inclusion or exclusion in the lending decision is on a case by case
basis. For new offshore projects the loan is established for a development program when the
reserves are classified as proven underdeveloped, with a high degree of certainty of successful
completion. Lenders do not give much weighting, if any, to reserve categories farther down the
spectrum such as probable or possible reserves."
East Coast Project Financing Issues
particular reserves will assist the lenders in assessing this risk. Where
production involves sophisticated technology, injection techniques or
unusual or complex geological formations, it will be important for
lenders to be able to rely on the opinions of credible, independent experts
in these areas. The degree to which individual sponsors have committed
substantial equity and have, or have involved persons having, experience
in producing from these types of formations or using these or similar
technologies, will be important considerations for the lenders. In circum-
stances where a project must rely on reserves that do not have a
production history, and where reserves cannot be classified as proven
until pressure maintenance has begun, for example, rating agencies may
find the risk acceptable given extensive modelling that supports the
reserve estimates, analagous producing fields from which to draw geo-
logic and reservoir conclusions, known technology and the expertise and
equity commitments from the sponsors.
66
4. Production Technology
The production from offshore oil or gas projects and the transportation of
product by pipeline or tanker often involves state-of-the-art technology
by the world's leading providers of that technology. The experience of
these providers and the participants in the projects are significant factors
in the lenders accepting the risks attendant upon their use, often in a harsh
environment and with complex and challenging reservoir characteristics.
Both the Hibernia and Terra Nova projects, for example, rely upon a
complex and unique array of offshore marine development and produc-
tion technologies. 67 The previous use of these technologies in other parts
of the world, the fact that the depths at which they are used are relatively
shallow compared with other functional production areas 68 and the
collective experience of the organizations involved in creating, installing
and utilizing these technologies in operations, as well as the experience
and expertise of the owners give the lenders comfort on this risk area. An
independent engineer's review and opinion will be a significant factor in
the lender acceptance of these risks.
5. Political
These consist of both risks common to any project (such as the role and
stance of government and opposition forces; changes in tax, regulatory
and legal regimes; expropriation; appropriation; whether project deci-
sions are subject to political influence or delay, etc.); and civil disruption.
66. See "S & P Husky Terra Nova", supra note 15 at 11.
67. See the discussion of those used in Terra Nova, ibid. at 16.
68. Ibid. at 17.
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Attempts may be made in some jurisdictions to have the government of
the jurisdiction in which the project is carried out accept some responsi-
bility for political risks. The extent to which obligations or payment, rate
or tariff provisions are adjusted to reflect cost increases resulting from
changes in law or political actions serves to allocate these risks between
non-government participants. If a party bearing such obligations or
making such payments has government support or the government agrees
to compensate it, the government may accept some of the risk. A
government may also give assurances there will be no nationalization or
expropriation, or at least that there will be fair compensation in such
events. Alternatively, a government may give some general comfort
language on maintaining the fiscal and other aspects of the legal regime
affecting the project that particular government is responsible for.
A basic problem with undertakings by governments in a parliamentary
democracy is the principle that one parliament cannot bind another.
Given this fundamental principle of parliamentary democracy, there may
be little a lender or a participant can do to achieve comfort the legal rules
will not change - except to try, through negotiating a set of undertakings
from the government of the day, with a set of compensation arrangements
in place if the events contemplated by those undertakings do not materi-
alize, to raise the threshold of political embarrassment involved in that or
future governments changing the legal rules, with a process for compen-
sation or perhaps even a buy-out in the event of unacceptable changes in
laws or regulatory requirements.
69
69. In foreign jurisdictions there may be insurance or some form of backstop arrangement
(government or otherwise) available to cover off some of the political risks. An example is the
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) for U.S. companies and the Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), an affiliate of the World Bank Group. The Export
Development Corporation (EDC) in Canada assists Canadian exporters in certain fields
(engineering and project management, scientific and technical services, transportation, energy
services and construction) by providing a range of financial and risk management services such
as export credit insurance, financing to foreign buyers of Canadian goods and services, and
guarantees. These include contract bonding, performance security insurance, medium to long-
term financing, and limited recourse project financing. The EDC is a financially self-sustaining
Crown corporation of the federal government that operates on commercial principles. It usually
requires a minimum of 50 percent Canadian content. The goods and services need to be
exported from Canada to another country. EDC also provides political risk insurance in support
of Canadian investments abroad or on export of Canadian goods or services. Such policies
insure against losses due to transfer and incontrovertibility of funds, expropriation andpolitical
unrest. Vinter, supra note 1 at 187-208. See also the discussion by M. Kantor, "Summary of
Project Finance Programs of U.S. Eximbank, (Export - Import Bank of the United States),
OPIC, JEXIM (Export Import Bank of Japan), ECGD (Export Credits Guarantee Department)"
in Project Financing: Domestic andInternational (New York: Practising Law Institute, 1995).
See also P.F. Fitzgerald, "Overview of Rules in International Project Financing" in Project
Financing from Domestic to International: Building Infrastructure Projects in Developing
Markets (New York: Practising Law Institute, 1995).
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Given the principle of parliamentary democracy discussed above,
there will almost certainly be concerns with respect to enforceability of
government undertakings and the ability to recover compensation if they
are not observed.
6. Suppliers
This involves an assessment of the materials, utilities and labour required
to construct and operate the project and the factors that affect their
availability, quality and costs. The reliability of the sources (physical and
entity), and the costs and other things required and risks encountered
(transportation delays, customs, exchange restrictions, currency fluctua-
tions, import restrictions, embargoes, etc.) to get these items from the
source to their use in the project must be considered. Generally, the
participants attempt to have the supplier bear these risks under the terms
of the supply contract but, depending on the availability of other markets
and the attractiveness of the project as a purchaser of the material or
service, a supplier may be successful in limiting its risk, often to all or a
portion of the price paid for the thing supplied or some other pre-agreed
limit on liability. The risk of supplier failure or unavailability of a product
or service required for the project must be allocated among the partici-
pants and the lenders.
7. Currency
Currency risks relate to the currencies used in different parts of the project
and its operations (supplier and construction costs, operating and main-
tenance costs, debt servicing and repayment, purchase of product or use
of service, etc.), and involve factors such as inflation, changes in
valuation of the currencies involved and possible restActions on the
movement of currencies from particular jurisdictions. The risks of
changes in exchange rates between currencies in which costs are incurred
and the compensation paid to the party incurring the cost may be allocated
through indexing to other currencies, and the extent to which this
indexing does or does not reflect the actual exchange differences affects
the degree to which the risk is allocated from one party to another. The
risk of inflation may be allocated in the same manner - by adjusting the
payments to a party in accordance with an agreed inflation index. The risk
of exchange restrictions is usually dealt with by assurances from the host
governments that the participants will be able to freely move currency to
and from their country or to provide adequate compensation or a buy-out
undertaking in the event of a failure to do so.
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70. Fitzgerald, ibid. at 9.
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8. Legal and Regulatory
This involves an assessment of the effectiveness of the applicable legal
regimes in recognizing and enforcing the intended interests of the
participants in the project in accordance with the expressions of those
interests in the project agreements and the ability of the participants to
satisfy the legal requirements imposed by those regimes. In particular,
does the legal regime clearly establish and protect the rights to produce
or transport the commodity, or perform the service the project relates to,
and the rights in relation to the assets used to do that, are those rights
transferable, can they be the subject of enforceable security interests, and
are they subject to termination for circumstances other than default?
What approvals will be required for the construction and operation of the
project and what is involved in obtaining these?
Notwithstanding the choice of law clauses in the project agreements,7
the ability to realize upon the collateral that exists in a particular
jurisdiction will depend on the laws and courts, agencies or government
authorities of that jurisdiction.
9. Design and Engineering
This involves both the risk that the initial design and engineering will not
be adequate, and the possibility of changes required either to correct
deficiencies or by later potential design enhancements. There will be
issues as to standards of performance and the obligations of the party
providing these services if the performance is defective. There are risks
relating to the particular technology used with respect to the project.
Many international engineering firms attempt to limit recoverable dam-
ages for their defective performance to a portion of the price they are paid
for services or to a liquidated damages formula. A basic issue is to what
extent the risk of improper design or engineering work is the responsibil-
ity of the party performing the work and what limitations is that assump-
tion of risk subject to in the contract. The contractual limitations on a
party's liability may not affect liability to third parties resulting from the
defective work. A party may be required to correct deficiencies in its work
or it may have obligations for the performance of the completed facility.
The limitations of liability may not apply to fraud, negligence (ordinary
or gross) or wilful misconduct, to items insured against (to the extent of
insurance) or in the event of a substantial breach of the party's
obligations.
71. For a discussion of choice of law provisions in a project financing context see K. Mettifil,
"Governing - Law Clauses of Loan Agreements in International Project Financing" (1986) 20
Int'l Lawyer 219.
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10. Construction
The basis of compensation for the construction work itself (fixed price/
unit cost/cost plus/risk-reward) allocates some of the risks, as does the
scope of work and provisions dealing with force majeure, equitable
adjustments, change in circumstances and the standard contractual allo-
cation techniques such as representations and warranties, indemnities,
guarantees of performance, direct assumption of risk clauses, limitation
provisions and the like. Problems that can arise in construction, such as
construction and material deficiencies by the contractor and its subcon-
tractors, inability to acquire necessary property rights, inadequacy of
insurance and bonding, increased costs required to complete the work as
specified, failure to obtain permits or approvals as required, changes in
the work, damage to work or persons or property from the work, and
regulatory sanctions, are all factors that can result in increased time or
costs for construction. Provisions dealing with bonuses for early comple-
tion and liquidated damages or penalties for delay or failure in completion
are used by parties to provide for such contingencies. In an alliance
context, the risk and reward formula is intended to address the costs or
savings that result from defective or better than target performance. The
parties usually involved in the allocation of these risks are the contractor
or alliance, subcontractors and suppliers, the participants and the users of
the service resulting from the project together with their respective
backers such as guarantors, sureties, insurers and other parties providing
comfort or support in respect of the performance of the primary obligations.
There may be a cap on liabilities - it may be individual and cumula-
tive or there may be time limits on the entitlement to be compensated for
losses due to breach of warranty or of contractual obligations. There is
often exclusion of consequential or extraordinary losses.
The risk of incompleteness or inaccuracy of information supplied by
the owner or other parties to the contractor or alliance is also relevant.
There is often an exclusion of warranties or other responsibility by the
owners as to information provided.
11. Site
These risks relate to geography, geology, environment (such as weather),
other operations in the area, civil unrest, etc. If different conditions are
encountered, whose responsibility are those? Are they foreseeable or
non-foreseeable? What are the parties' obligations to inspect or other-
wise take changes in site conditions into account?72 How are hazardous
materials dealt with?
72. For a discussion of clauses dealing with changes in site conditions see S.C. Sanders,
"Unanticipated Environmental Costs In Construction Contracts: The Differing Site Condi-
tions Clause as a Risk Allocation Tool" (1994) 11 Int'l Constr. L. Rev. 466.
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12. Completion and Start-up
Performance, start-up or drawdown tests and commissioning will gener-
ally end the contractor/alliance risk and begin the operator/owner risk.
Satisfaction of the tests provides evidence that the project is capable of
operating at the level of performance considered (and established by
contract) to be necessary to service and repay debt and pay operating
costs. Start-up and operating risks include technological failure or
obsolescence, changes in law, uninsured risks, availability or costs of raw
materials and labour, shifts in demand or price received for service, and
negligence in project operations. There may be a liquidated damages
formula in place to compensate for performance deficiencies demon-
strated on start-up and commissioning tests, with a range of results in
which the participants can or must accept the facility and look to this
compensation for comfort rather than rejecting the facility if it does not
meet these tests.
Project lenders do not usually advance funds on a limited recourse
basis before completion and start-up occur.73 They are not normally
comfortable assuming the risks the project will not be completed or of
delays in completion or cost overruns that delay debt repayment or
increase capitalized interest. 74 The result is generally either a delay in the
advance of project financing until completion tests are satisfied or, if
project financing is advanced prior to production start-up, additional
recourse of the lenders (through guarantees, backstops, completion
commitments, debt repayment or assumption obligations, cost overrun
commitments or other forms of credit enhancement, such as contingency
accounts or debt reserve accounts) from participants or their sponsors
until such completion tests have been satisfied. 5
Drawdown or completion tests generally involve agreed-upon cover-
age ratios in respect of the net present value of the cash flow available for
debt service (generally cash flow from operations after payment of capital
and operating expenses and royalties but before payment of debt service
and taxes) that measure the future debt-servicing capacity of the project.76
These measures will be applied to the life of the project, the life of the
project loan facilities, the historical cash flow available for debt service
from the project for a stipulated period in relation to specified repayment
73. Mills, supra note 2 at 307.
74. Ibid.
75. Waddingham, supra note 48 at 436, discusses a cost overrun pool, a technique used in
North Sea financings whereby lenders and sponsors shared some of the completion risks.
76. Mills, supra note 2 at 310. See also Waddingham, ibid. at 427-29, for a useful discussion
of cover ratios; Mills, supra note 56, for a detailed review of the economic evaluation of oil and
gas development projects by commercial bankers; and Wood, supra note 1 at 26-27.
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and servicing of project debt, and the cash flow available for debt service
in relation to the agreed debt service on project debt.
The lenders' efforts to evaluate and minimize completion risk will also
include an assessment of the contractual arrangements in place to achieve
completion (fixed price/alliance contracting structures), the experience,
reputation and ability (financial and otherwise) of the participants and
other parties involved in activities critical to completion, credit enhance-
ments (such as sponsor guarantees, performance bonds, and course of
construction insurance which the lenders may want security on as well)
that improve the odds that the persons having obligations for construction
and completion will perform these obligations, and confirmation by
independent experts of the condition and suitability of the physical asset
cost estimates used to create the financial projections to apply the
required completion test cover ratios. The loan or credit agreements with
the project lenders will generally specify the circumstances in which the
completion tests will be performed, the conditions precedent to their
performance and the information required by the lenders (whether
internal to the participants and the operator or based on an independent
petroleum engineer's estimates) as to reserves, capital and operating
costs and production volumes using factors such as commodity prices,
interest rates, currency rates and inflation measures that are determined
in a manner agreed to by the parties, as well as risk weighting of the
different categories of reserves. The successful commissioning of the
project in accordance with its technical requirements is referred to by
lenders as "financial completion. '77 The steps required to achieve this are
intended to ensure that the project, being physically complete in the sense
of operating at a prescribed level of capacity or having achieved certain
specified production levels, is also generating or capable of generating
the required cash flow to repay and service the project debt.
78
13. Operating
Successful operations depend on the personnel, experience, knowledge,
reputation, financial status and local contacts of the operator. Operating
costs can exceed budget because of design or equipment defects; inaccu-
rate or incomplete assessments of the production or throughput process ;
79
factors affecting quality, cost, availability and performance of materials,
equipment and labour; changes in standards under laws or regulatory
authorities; adequacy of insurance; or hazardous substances. Poor opera-
77. Mills, ibid. at 308.
78. Waddingham, supra note 48 at 435.
79. Wynant, supra note 1 at 167.
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tions can result in failures to achieve projected financial performance of
the project. The operating agreement may provide for liquidated damages
or bonus payments for operating performance in relationship to targeted
performance, with the targets adjusted for risks not considered to be the
responsibility of the operator. The operator's exposure to these risks may
be limited if the exposure is felt to be inconsistent with inducing the
operator to run the project efficiently. The users of the project or the
purchasers of its production and the owners may share in these risks, to
the extent not absorbed by the operator, based on the extent to which
changes in operating costs are reflected in the rates charged for use of the
project's services or the price of the commodity.
14. Market
The market for the production from or the services of the project will
affect the cash flow available to service the project financing and provide
the returns to justify the project. Factors that influence this market include
the demand for the product or service, the length and price of commit-
ments to take or use alternative sources of products or services, techno-
logical changes, the costs of market access, changes in taxes imposed on
returns from the production or use of the facility and generally any factors
that influence the demand for the production or the use of the project
facilities. Fixed or floor prices or price escalation provisions can shift
some of the price risks to purchasers of the product or users of the
service. 0
15. Financing
Since the project, in a project financing situation, is not financed by
equity- or entity-based borrowings of the participants (with full recourse
to the participants), the recourse limitations of the loan require that the
combination of contractual, regulatory and other external elements that
form or affect the project will produce sufficient cash flow to service
debt."' A fundamental element of such project financing is enforceable
collateral security in the form of assignments of project revenues to
support debt obligations from the participants. Credit enhancement from
the participants may be required to support the risk allocation.
This credit enhancement may be by way of letters of credit, capital
contribution commitments, completion assurances, guarantees, insur-
ance, indemnities, etc. Guarantees may take the form of limited, direct,
indirect, implied or deficiency guarantees by the participants, guarantees
80. Ibid. at 170.
81. Hoffman, supra note 1 at 629.
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by third parties not directly participating in the project or in some cases
contingent guarantees or so-called "comfort obligations.
'
"82
Lenders are usually only prepared to take design and construction risk,
completion risk, start-up risk and performance risk where they are
dealing with proven technology, predictable construction and the ability
to mitigate these risks through insurance, guarantees from contractors
and other third-party risk enhancements. Limited recourse financing may
only be available after drawdown or performance tests establish the
project's performance capabilities.83 It may be that in order to make a
project financeable, there would need to be some form of recourse or
credit enhancement until the drawdown or performance tests had been
met. Other credit enhancement mechanisms include surety obligations,
take-or-pay contracts and indemnification obligations.
Contracts required to construct and operate the project, such as the
documents giving the right to develop, the documents granting the
interest in the site, and the design, construction and procurement con-
tracts with respect to facilities, must not interfere unduly with the
projected debt repayment from project revenues.14 These project con-
tracts must be enforceable and of value as collateral security. The lenders
will require a security interest in, or conditional assignment of, each
significant project contract.
16. Environmental
Environmental risk is a major concern in offshore projects. To that end,
the agreements relating to the construction and operation process will
generally contain detailed provisions allocating the risk of costs and
liabilities associated with environmental liabilities. Again, there will be
costs incurred for reducing or avoiding environmental losses and liabili-
ties, costs incurred in dealing with environmental losses or liabilities for
which a party is responsible, costs of procuring insurance or other third-
party protection against environmental liability and the costs incurred in
connection with that liability. Given the significant exposure that could
result from a spill or contamination during construction or operation of
the project facility, or the transportation of production to market from the
facility, the credit support or enhancement available in respect of a party's
assumption of risk will be an important factor in the lender's assessment
of the exposure. The starting point for such assessment will be the legal
regime applicable to the project, the nature of the construction, operating
82. Wynant, supra note 1 at 171. For a discussion of the legal effect of a so-called "comfort
letter", see Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Malaysia Mining, [1988] 1 All E.R. 714 (Q.B.).
83. Wynant, ibid.
84. Hoffman, supra note 1 at 7.
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and transportation activities and the adverse environmental effects that
could result in the course of those activities. Liabilities that attach by
virtue of the general legal system if the parties do nothing to re-allocate
the risk must be considered, followed by means available to the parties to
deal with the risks through best practices, insurance, contract or other
means.8
5
17. Abandonment and Decommissioning
Abandonment and decommissioning costs represent significant project
liabilities and should be addressed in the ownership and operating
arrangements. Again, this is a matter of considerable concern to project
lenders. In a default scenario, the project lender may, and the assignee of
the defaulting participant's interest in the project on foreclosure will, be
liable for such costs. Accordingly, the ownership and operating arrange-
ments should provide for an effective mechanism to fund abandonment
and decommissioning obligations. Current tax laws and royalty agree-
ments do not foster the creation of funded reserves in the oil and gas sector
to cover these obligations. However, ownership and operating arrange-
ments can and should provide a mechanism whereby these costs are dealt
with. This can be done by requiring project participants to provide
acceptable security for abandonment and decommissioning costs at an
appropriate time. Such security could be provided by letters of credit or
other cash equivalent security. The amount and timing of the security will
be linked to the present value of the remaining economically recoverable
reserves.
18. Force Majeure
Force majeure is an interesting concept in project financing situations.
The underlying project agreements often have a variety of approaches to
the subject - the extent to which performance of obligations will be
excused or delayed if prevented by causes that are beyond the reasonable
control of the party having the obligation. There are often significant
differences in the approach to force majeure among the various project
agreements, particularly if governments (who have within their area of
jurisdiction the ability to change the rules that govern the performance of
the parties' obligations) are parties to the agreements. The project lenders
typically resist any notion that a force majeure could have the effect of
interrupting their payment schedule, and will look to the participants or
project sponsors for recourse if this occurs. It is the consistency and "fit"
of the force majeure provisions of the various project agreements that will
85. Vinter, supra note 1 at 209-22.
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concern the lenders and their counsel. The effect of the limited scope of
aforce majeure clause in a particular contract is an important caution to
bear in mind - such provisions may not extend to parties outside the
contract (suppliers, for example) who may themselves be affected by
force majeure and on whose performance the performance of a party to
the contract depends.86
IX. Risk Allocation
The allocation of risks among parties involved in the project will be
negotiated on the basis of control over the circumstances creating the risk
and the consequences of the risk if it occurs, the rewards associated with
that control and the role and creditworthiness of the various parties. 87 In
a perfect world the allocation will be done on the basis of the party in the
best position to bear the risk from an economic standpoint. In reality and
in practice the allocation of risks depends on the bargaining position of
the various parties involved in the project and the ability of the project to
cover risk contingencies with the underlying cash flow and reserve
accounts. In arrangements involving fixed-price turnkey contracts, the
contractor may assume much of the construction, completion and start-
up risks. Following commissioning and start-up some of the project risks
can be assumed by others. If creditworthy purchasers of production can
be secured who will commit to take production or use services from the
project, on a basis that gives adequate revenue assurances, lenders may
be prepared to assume some operational risk once an effective start-up has
been achieved. It may also be possible after start-up to allocate some of
the risks to financial intermediaries who typically deal with the risks
associated with currency exchange, interest rates and commodity prices,
through arrangements such as swaps and forward sales. Other potential
participants in project risk-sharing include equipment vendors and raw
material, fuel and utility suppliers. Export credits and international
financing agents may also be of assistance in project financing debt.
86. Ibid. at 93-94. See also the discussion of force majeure in the context of project contracts
in I.R. Paulus & D.J. Meeuwig, "Force Majeure -Beyond Boilefplate" (1999) 37 Alta L. Rev.
302 at 313-14; P.L. 13runer, "Force Majeure Under International Law and International
Construction Contract Model Forms" (1995) 12 Int'l Constr. L. Rev. 274; S. Jeremiah,
"Insurability of Force Majeure Events in Construction Contracts" (1995) 12 Int'l Constr. L.
Rev. 319; and P.J.M. Declerq, "Modem Analysis of the Legal Effect of Force Majeure Clauses
in Situations of Commercial Impracticability" (1995) 15 J. L. & Com. 213.
87. Hoffman, supra note I at 41. For an excellent discussion of project risk and its
management, see C. Chapman & S. Ward, Project Risk Management: Processes, Techniques
and Insights (Chichester, NY: John Wiley & Sons, 1997).
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A party to whom a risk is allocated agrees to bear the costs if the loss
or damage that the risk represents occurs.
Obligations alone are not enough. They must be enforceable to be
effective. In the Canadian common law system, a party, in order to have
a legal obligation to another party, must be privy to an enforceable
contract the other party is also privy to, or subject to an obligation arising
by virtue of trust, agency or some other recognized means of conferring
rights for the benefit of third parties."8
In addition, there must be consideration of the actual means and
likelihood of recovery on obligations - even if they are enforceable
against a party. What is behind the party to whom the risk is allocated?
What is its reputation, competence, creditworthiness? Are there other
backers or persons who have an interest in the party's successful perfor-
mance? What assets of the party or persons supporting its obligations
may be realized upon to satisfy damages or losses incurred by its failure
to perform its obligations, and how difficult and costly is it to actually
realize on those assets?
Factors that should guide the parties in negotiating risk allocation on
a project include the following:
(a) What party has or has available to it the greatest expertise in
dealing with the risk or areas that avoid or reduce the risk?
(b) What financial capacity does a party have to accept the risk?
(c) What compensation does a party receive for performing its
obligations in relation to the work and how does this compare to
the potential cost or damage if the risk occurs?
(d) What party has the comparative cost advantage in bearing
responsibility for the risk and in preventing it?
(e) What party is best able to control or manage the risk?
(f) What are other available means of allocating the risk and the cost
and responsibility for the cost of those?
The process is one of identifying the risks, analyzing the factors
relevant to the most optimal allocation of the risks, negotiating based on
those factors and then specifying in the relevant contracts how the risk is
allocated.
88. See Greenwood Shopping Plaza v. Beattie (1980), 111 D.L.R. (3d) 257 at 263-65
(S.C.C.), per McIntyre J.; and the more recent consideration of the issue in London Drugs v.
Kuehne & Nagle International (1992), 97 D.L.R. (4th) 261 at 343-70 (S.C.C.), per Iacobucci
J. See the recent English legislative initiative in the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act
1999 (U.K.), 1999, c. 31.
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X. Review of Risk Allocation Arrangements
Typically, there will be a thorough review of the project agreements and
the risk allocation under them. This may be done as part of the initial
negotiation of these arrangements, as part of the financial advisors'
retainer, in the course of preparation of an information memorandum or
similar document or as part of lender due diligence. Indeed, it is often
done in all these circumstances. It is directed as assessing the "fit" of the
contractual, legal and regulatory regimes that relate to the project. If a risk
has not been assumed by one participant, where does it fall, either on the
basis of the project contracts or the general law? What assignability rights
exist and what is permitted under them? Are there obvious mismatches
between obligations and relief from those obligations?89
XI. Some Additional Lender Issues
There are a number of specific issues that potential lenders in an East
Coast project financing may be concerned about.9" We discuss thirteen
of these.
1. Project Definition
Lenders will want to be comfortable with the project definition found in
the project agreements. What can be done, within the framework of those
project agreements, to change that definition with the consequence that
the risks attendant on the project are materially different from those
contemplated in the original definition? The difference between what
lenders will accept as a variation on the implementation of the basic
project definition and what they will not accept as a material change in
that concept has been referred to as the divergence of the interests of debt
and equity. Lenders will want the right (directly by their consent or
indirectly by controlling the participant borrower whose consent is
required to make changes under the relevant project agreements) to have
a say in changes to the project definition they consider to be material.
2. Pre-Completion
The lenders' role in monitoring and approving cost overruns and changes
in project scheduling will be related to the degree of comfort they have
on completion assurances. If they have adequate assurances, their in-
volvement may be very limited. If they have any significant completion
risk they will want an actual monitoring/control role, generally through
an independent engineer.
89. Wood, supra note 1 at 13-14
90. Vinter, supra note 1 at 94-104, discusses requirements for bankability, and at 253-61
discusses North Sea legal issues in a project financing context.
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3. Operating Expenses
Lenders will generally recognize that expenses required to operate and
maintain the project have priority over their claims on revenues for debt
service but will want to ensure that expenditures they consider to be
equity-based do not have such priority and are subordinate to their claim
for debt service.
4. Default
Lenders will want to have a role in relation to default proceedings in
relation to a borrower under the project agreements in the sense of being
entitled to notice of any alleged default and an opportunity to cure the
default or to realize upon their collateral or both before steps are taken by
other participants to take over the defaulting participant's interest. They
will also want to be able to attend meetings of the governing body of the
participants in the place of the participant for such cure period if the
lenders have such a right under their agreements with the participant.
5. Reporting and Monitoring
Lenders will want the benefit of a detailed reporting or monitoring regime
with respect to the project, either through their own representatives or
through the operator providing them with copies of its reporting to the
participants in a form and frequency that the lenders are prepared to
accept.
6. Realization by Lenders
Lenders will require the ability to assume, in a legally effective way, the
interest of a defaulting participant and to deal with that interest in such a
way as to permit lenders to realize upon the collateral it represents as
security for their financing. Lenders will want to be a permitted assign of
that interest without further approval and to be able to participate under
the project agreements as such.
7. Ownership And Operating Arrangements
Lenders will want comfort that operations under the project agree-
ments will not prejudice their security without their consent (directly or
indirectly through the borrower participant). The dividing line is gener-
ally between normal course operations required to carry out the project
on the basis contemplated by the project agreements that the lenders have
received and accepted, and expenditures or operations (such as expan-
sions) that the lenders view as a point at which the interests of debt and
equity diverge.
The ownership and operating arrangements among the project partici-
pants will normally be put in place before project financing is undertaken.
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As such, the trustee holding the inter-participant security will register that
security before any project financing security has been granted. The
degree to which ownership and operating arrangements are lender
friendly will be a function of the convergence of the participants'
financing strategies and degree of readiness at the time the ownership and
operating arrangements are established. A project lender may find itself
having a third priority charge on project assets (behind security for
provincial royalties and participants' security). The extent to which the
project lender can enhance its priority will be a matter of negotiation at
the time of project financing. Enhancement will be easier if the project
lender is providing financing for the entire project. If the project lender
is providing financing to fewer than all the participants, it may be quite
difficult for the project lender to gain priority over the previously granted
participants' security as certain participants may not be particularly
motivated to cooperate in other participants' financing efforts and will
resist attempts to dilute their security position. This, of course, limits
project financing opportunities. That is not to say such financing cannot
be obtained, but it may involve more expensive borrowing, greater
non-project recourse to the borrower's assets and the requirement for
other forms of credit support.
A project lender must carefully review the operating, ownership and
joint venture agreements to confirm that there is an effective and efficient
arrangement in place among the project participants for the execution of
the project. Apart from this general concern, project lenders will have a
number of specific concerns with a project's operating and ownership
arrangements.
Of particular concern is the nature of the participant's obligation to
fund project expenditures prior to production start-up, the period of
highest risk to both equity and debt participants in the project. Operating
and ownership arrangements will typically have restrictions on the ability
of participants to withdraw. These may take a variety of forms. For
example, the operating and ownership arrangements could have a blanket
prohibition against, or no mention of, withdrawal prior to production
start-up, with full recourse against a participant that withdraws. Alterna-
tively, withdrawal rights may be limited. In some cases, withdrawal from
the project may only be allowed after some threshold amount has been
expended on the project. In others, withdrawal may be limited to
situations where the original pre-completion cost estimate has been
exceeded by a prescribed percentage. In any event, a project lender will
want to ensure, to the greatest extent possible, the commitment to the
project of the equity participants. This concern is, of course, shared by the
participants themselves. Given the enormous capital costs prior to pro-
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duction start-up, every participant shares in the concern that, if project
completion is not achieved, its investment may be lost. While normally
one thinks of contingent liabilities, it would not be unfair to think of the
project assets and related expenditures as contingent assets prior to
completion and production start-up.
Similarly, a project lender will take comfort in knowing that project
participants must assume a pro rata share of a defaulting participant's
share of project expenditures. In the case of a default, the other partici-
pants will be obligated to keep the project moving forward as a work-out
strategy is developed. As well, the degree of recourse to the non-project
revenues and assets of non-defaulting participants will be of importance
to project lenders and rating agencies.
Restrictions on assignability of a participant's interest in the project is
of critical importance to project lenders, particularly where the lender's
recourse is limited to the project and project assets. A project lender will
need the ability to assume, and eventually dispose of, a defaulting
participant's interest in the project. Also important to the lender is the
manner, if any, in which the ownership and operating arrangements deal
with royalty defaults. Failure to pay royalties can jeopardize the status of
the production licence, leading to its cancellation. In addition, royalty
defaults can, in the case of a royalty agreement applicable to the project,
lead to a termination of the agreement resulting in a loss of the "royalty
deal" negotiated by the project participants and possibly to its replace-
ment by more onerous royalty terms. As well, a royalty default might
trigger the exercise of various remedies available to government under a
royalty agreement. Such remedies could include realization by the
government of its security interest in project assets. Project participants
and project lenders share the same interest in keeping the project running
without disruption or government intervention. The ownership and
operating arrangements could place some onus on non-defaulting partici-
pants to address royalty defaults prior to government action. This might
entail the non-defaulting participants funding the defaulting participant's
royalty obligations during the work-out period or provisions that facili-
tate the project lender doing so. This will allow for an orderly disposition
of the defaulting participant's interest in the project to a new, more
financially capable participant. Ideally, the royalty agreement will con-
tain complementary provisions whereby the government agrees to a
"stand still" for as long as non-defaulting participants are actively seeking
a solution to the royalty default. This, of course, is in the interests of the
non-defaulting participants. As a practical matter, a default in payment of
royalties will in almost all circumstances be accompanied by a default
under the ownership and operating arrangements.
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Under the ownership and operating arrangements, there will invari-
ably be provisions whereby a participant's obligation to fund project
expenditures will be secured. The security provisions are of critical
importance to the lender. The security will typically include an operator's
lien, inter-participant security or both. An operator's lien secures ad-
vances made by the project operator on account of project expenditures
made for the joint account. Expenditures made by the operator for the
joint account are then recouped by the operator billing the participants for
their respective share of joint account expenditures. The lien attaches to
each participant's interest in the project assets and project production.
Under the Accord Acts, the operator's lien is given first priority over all
other security interests in the production licence unless that lien is subject
to a registered postponement. Project lenders recognize that advances by
the operator are essential for the ongoing needs of the project and
generally do not have a problem with regard to the lien's priority. As a
practical matter, however, the operator's lien is becoming less relevant.
The enormous costs of offshore energy projects have driven operators to
abandon or limit the approach of advancing funds for the joint account.
Rather, cash call or zero balance banking procedures are used. Under the
cash call system, the operator estimates expenditures to be made for the
joint account and requires participants to pay to the operator their share
of costs in advance. Under the zero balance banking procedure, each
participant's share of project costs is funded through a special banking
facility whereby costs incurred by the operator for the joint account are
automatically removed from each participant's bank account on a daily
basis. In either case, the operator does not advance funds on behalf of the
other participants.
Given the cash call and zero balance banking procedures, the operator's
lien is becoming less and less important. More important is the inter-
participants' security. Typically, each participant will grant security in its
interest in the project to each of the other participants to secure its
obligation to fund joint account expenditures. Given the enormous costs
of offshore energy projects, each of the participants will seek this type of
security and insist that it constitutes a first charge subject only to the
government's security in respect of royalty obligations. The participants'
security is usually held by a security trustee on behalf of the participants.
Participants' security is of particular concern to project lenders as it will,
in most cases rank in priority to the lender's security. This should not be
an insurmountable obstacle to project lenders, because this security
backstops the equity and project commitment of the participants. How-
ever, this prior charge is a concern to lenders and this concern may lead
to negotiated inter-creditor arrangements designed to ensure an appropri-
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ate allocation of risk between debt and equity and an orderly response to
participant default.
As noted above, royalty agreements can be more or less lender
friendly. The same is true of ownership and operating arrangements. The
degree to which ownership and operating arrangements are lender
friendly will be a function of how far along the participants are in relation
to specific project financing strategies at the time the ownership and
operating arrangements are negotiated and the degree of commonality in
financing strategies among the participants. If all or a significant number
of participants anticipate pursuing a particular project financing strategy,
the ownership and operating arrangements are likely to be drafted in a
way that will accommodate such strategies. Input from lenders and their
counsel at this stage can assist in structuring the ownership and operating
arrangements in a manner that facilitates rather than impedes financing
efforts.
Project lenders in making financing decisions must concern themselves
with the following aspects of the ownership and operating arrangements:
(a) Will the security taken by the lenders be a permitted encum-
brance (generally, ownership and operating arrangements limit
what encumbrances participants may have on their interests in
the project)?
(b) What priority, if any, will the lenders have vis-t-vis the security
granted by the participants to each other to secure their respective
funding obligations in respect of the project?
(c) What restrictions are there on assignability of the ownership and
operating arrangements and related project agreements?
(d) Will the lenders be entitled to timely notice of default by a
participant under the ownership and operating arrangements?
(e) What rights will the lenders have in relation to operating a
defaulting participant's interest pending a foreclosure and sale
by the lenders of that interest?
(f) What remedies do non-defaulting participants have in relation to
the defaulting participant and how might these affect the lenders'
position (typically, a defaulting participant will have a limited
period to cure a default under the ownership and operating
arrangements, failing which its interest in the project is forfeited
to the non-defaulting participants)?
(g) What rights or obligations will the lenders have to remedy
defaults by a participant during a work-out period?
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Failure to address these issues in the ownership and operating arrange-
ments may impede the ability to arrange project financing. The project
lenders may require amendments to the ownership and operating arrange-
ments as a condition of advancing project financing. The lenders may also
require the participants to enter into elaborate inter-creditor agreements.
These amendments to the ownership and operating arrangements and the
entering into of inter-creditor agreements may be difficult to achieve if
not all of the participants are pursuing the same financing strategy.
8. Insurance
Lenders will want comfort as to the insurance program in place for the
project and their rights in relation to insurance money payable as a result
of the damage or destruction of the project assets. This is of particular
importance in the project financing of an undivided interest in a project.
Where a participant self-insures a portion of the insurance program, the
lenders may require a full recourse covenant from the participant to make
such self-insurance available to the project.
9. Alliance
An alliance presents project lenders with an interesting variation on risk
allocation in the construction phase:
(a) Each participant in the alliance and each of its subcontractors
assumes responsibility for damage to its own property and death
of or injury to its own employees.
(b) The owners are generally responsible for any loss of the work.
(c) Each participant in the alliance generally bears its own conse-
quential losses.
(d) There should be no claims among alliance participants relating
to cost overruns or delay costs, all of which should be captured
in the risk/reward formula.
(e) Usually each alliance contractor provides a warranty on its scope
of work. The cost of warranty work may or may not be included
in the target cost.
(f) The risk of environmental contamination from equipment used
in construction may be borne by the alliance. All other
environmental risk is generally borne by the owners.
(g) Usually the owners bear any upside or downside associated with
exchange risk.
(h) Usually all recoverable taxes are excluded from the final calcu-
lation of project cost and the owners bear the risk of any increase
in taxes or the enactment of any new tax.
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(i) There is generally a comprehensive insurance program for the
project that insures all project participants with insurance
recoveries credited to the final cost calculation.
(j) Most alliances provide for a comprehensive release of claims
among the alliance participants at the end of the project subject
to certain exceptions.
The lack of a testing program in the alliance context has been raised as
a concern in some circumstances." The fact that an alliance does not
offer a "single, fixed-price, turnkey, date certain engineering, procure-
ment and construction (EPC) contractor to whom the project and lenders
can turn to for recourse if the project is not complete and operational by
a certain date" has also been noted. What the lenders do rely on is that the
alliance is "an owner-general contractor entity that has enormous incen-
tives to complete the project and see to it that it operates as designed" and
the experience and financial commitments of the owners.
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10. Royalties
As noted already, Newfoundland, under the contractual royalty regime
negotiated with respect to Hibernia and the proposed contractual royalty
regime for Terra Nova, has required security for royalties owing to the
province in the form of a first charge against certain assets of the
participant including the production licence and proceeds from the
disposition of the production licence.
With respect to projects where the royalty agreement or hybrid
(agreement-regulation) model is used, project lenders must pay particular
attention to a variety of issues, including
(a) the degree to which the royalty rates and triggers and cost
deduction rules reflect the economic modelling for the project
utilized by the lender in connection with project financing
decisions;
(b) the degree to which cost deduction rules accommodate the
particular project financing structure, particularly in cases where
unconventional and off-balance-sheet financing techniques are
used to ensure not only the deductibility of expenditures but the
time at which they are recognized for royalty purposes (this is
important in relation to the availability of return on capital
allowances under the royalty rules, the attainment of payout and
the escalation from low pre-payout gross royalty rates to higher
post-payout net profit royalty rates);
91. "S & P Husky Terra Nova", supra note 15 at 10.
92. Ibid.
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(c) the assignability of the royalty agreement in cases of default (i.e.,
can the lenders or their assignee have the benefit of the royalty
agreement in a foreclosure situation?);
(d) the right, if any, of the lenders to maintain the royalty agreement
in effect by curing past and current royalty defaults of adefaulting
borrower (ideally, from the lenders' perspective, the lenders
would only be responsible for current royalty obligations pending
completion of a workout exercise);
(e) the rights of the province to cancel the royalty agreement as
against a defaulting participant or as against the project as a
whole (the risk here being the imposition of less favourable
royalty terms either by regulation or negotiation of new contractual
terms in the face of a default); and
(f) the security taken by the province in relation to the project
production licence and other project assets, and the priority that
security will have vis-a-vis the lenders' security (of particular
importance where project financing has been undertaken on a
non-recourse or limited recourse basis and access by the lender
to project assets is essential).
To some extent, opportunities exist to make the royalty agreement
lender friendly by taking into account the foregoing matters. However,
the ability to do so depends upon how far advanced project financing
plans are at the time of royalty agreement negotiations. This, in turn, will
depend on the borrowing needs of the participants and whether they are
compatible as amongst the group, and the degree of readiness of the
participants to proceed with project financing. Failure to address project
financing at the royalty negotiation stage can lead to difficulties later on.
Neither the government nor the participants will be particularly keen to
reopen a signed royalty agreement so as to better accommodate financing
needs down the road. As time elapses, each party will, through experience
working with the royalty agreement, identify areas where the agreement
does not work to their advantage or in the way originally anticipated.
11. Redetermination
The terms for development of an offshore oil project, in which all the
development drilling has not been completed, may require a redetermi-
nation of the field interests a certain number of years following produc-
tion start-up.
Unitization and reserves redetermination are of concern to project
lenders. To date, no offshore East Coast energy project has entailed
unitization other than Terra Nova. Unitization is a process whereby
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parties holding licences for different geographic areas overlaying a
common reservoir agree to consolidate their interests in those licence
areas such that project costs and revenues are shared based on the relative
contribution of hydrocarbon reserves from the various licence areas. The
Accord Acts provide for two forms of unitization. One form requires the
entering into of a formal unit agreement and unit operating agreement
which is filed with, and approved by, the appropriate board as required
under the legislation. The other is a short-form unitization whereby the
holders of two or more significant discovery licences may apply to the
applicable board for the issuance of one production licence covering the
area of the significant discovery licences. Unitization necessarily in-
volves determining the amount of hydrocarbon reserves located within
each licence area and an allocation of working interests in the project
based on each participant's relative contribution of reserves to the unit.
This allocation is done relatively early in the development phase of the
project and is based on the available geological, engineering and other
data gathered during the exploration phase. Additional data will be
obtained as the project proceeds through further delineation work and
production activities. Accordingly, once a project has been in production
for several years a more refined estimate of relative reserves contribution
can be made. As such, ownership and operating arrangements may
provide for one or more redeterminations, in which earlier allocations of
working interests are revised to better reflect each participant's actual
contribution of reserves. As part of the redetermination process, there will
be a reallocation of sharing in project costs and revenues. This realloca-
tion will apply to future operations and is often retrospective. Because of
the enormous pre-completion costs, a great deal of technical work is done
prior to the initial allocation of working interests. As such, dramatic
changes in working interests are not expected on redetermination. How-
ever, even small changes can significantly and adversely affect the
economics of the project for a participant whose working interest in the
project is reduced on redetermination. Such changes in working interest
will not be particularly problematic for a project lender that is providing
project financing for all of the participants on the same terms and
conditions. On the other hand, if a lender is providing financing to a
particular participant only, redetermination is a risk factor that must be
considered in lending decisions.
12. Lifting and Transportation
Project financing relies primarily, if not exclusively, on project cash flow
to repay and service debt. The lifting and transportation arrangements
applicable to a project are vitally important to each participant's revenue
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stream and its ability to meet financing obligations. Accordingly, project
lenders must carefully assess the impact of the applicable lifting and
transportation arrangements. From a lender's perspective, the timing and
frequency of liftings directly impacts the cash flow of a participant and
the ability to service debt. If lenders are financing the entire project, this
is not of great concern. On the other hand, if the project lenders are
financing only a particular participant, then the terms of the loan will need
to be tailored to the lifting and cash flow cycle of that participant. In any
event, the lenders must carefully review the lifting arrangements to
ensure that they are consistent with the debt service and repayment terms
contemplated by the project financing. As well, the project lenders must
consider what the respective rights and obligations of the participants are
in the case of a failure to lift or other default under the lifting arrangements
by a participant. An assignment of the lifting agreement should form part
of the project lenders' security package.
From a project lender's perspective, the transportation arrangements
for an offshore production project are also very important. These must be
carefully reviewed to ensure that each participant has sufficient capacity
rights in the tankers and other facilities to effectively move its share of
production to market and thus generate revenue to service and repay debt.
This will entail reviewing all the relevant transportation and transship-
ment agreements, which include the ownership and operating arrange-
ments applicable to any owned vessels, the time charters applicable to
chartered vessels, the voyage charters under which participants will ship
crude oil on owned and chartered vessels, the capacity service agree-
ments in relation to the transshipment facility and any regional agree-
ments under which. the capacity of the available tankers may be pooled.
Assignment of such agreements may form part of the project lenders'
security package.
The Sable project presents different transportation issues. This gas
project is served by a pipeline that brings offshore production to an
onshore gas processing facility and then further transports the processed
gas to markets in Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and the United States. A
project lender must consider what arrangements project participants have
made for the processing and transportation of their share of gas produc-
tion from the offshore production. Gas processing and transportation can
be made on a long-term or short-term basis, and on a firm or interruptible
basis. The particular mix of arrangements will be made by project
participants based on their assessment of the gas market, deliverability of
production, the volume of long-term, firm sales and other such factors.
From a project lender's perspective, it is critical that participants have
sufficient capacity, either on a firm or interruptible basis, to move
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sufficient volumes of gas to market to generate the revenues needed to
repay and service debt. Again, the transportation agreements between the
project participants and the pipeline and the pipeline's tolls and tariffs (as
approved by the National Energy Board) must be carefully reviewed.
Assignment of the transportation agreements may form part of the
security package for project lenders in respect of an offshore gas project.
13. Production Sales
Sales of petroleum substances, ultimately, provide the cash flow to repay
and service project debt for an offshore development project. While the
project lender will take an assignment of production revenue as part of its
security package, specific assignments of crude oil sales contracts will
usually not be taken because of their short-term nature. In the case where
the participant' s affiliate does the refining of production from the project,
the project lender will need to be comfortable with the refining capacity
and operational ability of the participant's affiliate.
In the case of a gas project, the lender will need to analyze the gas
marketing strategy of the participant to ensure that the mix is based on
reasonable assumptions as to volume and prices at the time the project
financing is undertaken. Assignment of large volume, long-term gas sales
contracts for utilities and industrial purposes may form part of the project
lenders' security package.93
Conclusion
As can be seen from the foregoing, there are some interesting and
challenging issues in any East Coast project financing. The progression
of energy development in this region, whether through offshore projects,
transportation systems, infrastructure support or other projects or facili-
ties, will offer many opportunities for creative refinements and innova-
tions in the approaches to resolving these issues.
93. For a discussion of the financeability of such agreements, see Roberts, supra note 49.
